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Hello everyone,

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thank you so much for joining us for

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the latest segment of Effective Change,

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EFF's livestream series where our

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panelists tackle the latest issues in

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civil liberties and human rights in

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technology and the digital world.

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My name is Wren,

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I'm the Associate Director of State

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Affairs at the Electronics Frontier

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Foundation.

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and I'll be your host for today's

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discussion.

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Before proceeding,

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we have a few housekeeping items to go

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over.

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We will be recording this session,

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but only a video of our participants,

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our speakers will be included.

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Please do join us now in the official

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chat via Twitch on EFF.org slash live

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stream.

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You can drop your questions in the chat

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throughout the program and our guests will

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answer as many as they can in the

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end.

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And if you're comfortable,

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we encourage you to type a hello in

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the chat now to let us know which

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part of the world you're tuning in from.

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For those of you who aren't familiar with

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the Electronic Frontier Foundation,

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EFF is a nonprofit whose technologists,

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activists and attorneys have been fighting

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for your online privacy and free speech

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since nineteen ninety.

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You are the reason EFF can take on

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this important work.

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So if you'd like to help us in

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the fight to defend your digital freedoms,

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please consider donating at EFF.org slash

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support change or picking up a cool bit

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of EFF merch at shop.eff.org.

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And with that,

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I would love to welcome our speakers,

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Alexis, Cynthia, and Hana.

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First off, we have Alexis Hancock,

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who is the EFF Director of Engineering and

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focuses on expansion of encryption,

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digital identity,

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and firmware transparency.

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Next, we have Cynthia Conti-Cook,

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who is the Director of Research and Policy

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at the Collaborative Research Center for

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Resilience,

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who focuses on digital public

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infrastructure,

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digital identity and wallets,

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government procurement of technology,

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and how workers can influence tech

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procurement in government and their

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industry.

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Last but certainly not least,

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we have Hannah Mimon,

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who is a software developer at Gen Z

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for Change and focuses on developing

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digital advocacy tools for immigration,

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labor, climate,

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and reproductive justice campaigns.

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We'll have about fifteen minutes for your

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questions at the end,

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so if we haven't touched on something that

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you want to hear about,

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please ask by adding them in the chat

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at any time.

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So let's get started.

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So today we're here to discuss age

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verification or age gating laws,

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which are laws that generally require

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websites and apps to check or estimate

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every user's age before allowing access to

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certain content or services.

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These are laws that are often enforced

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using invasive tools like government ID

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uploads, biometric scans,

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or so-called age estimation technologies.

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Governments in the US and around the world

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are rapidly adopting these laws in the

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name of protecting children online.

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But in practice,

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they create new systems of surveillance,

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censorship,

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and exclusion that affect everyone.

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In twenty twenty five,

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age verification moved from a fringe

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policy idea to a widespread reality across

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the world.

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Nearly half of the US now mandates age

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checks for adult content or social media.

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Congress recently had a hearing dedicated

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to nineteen federal bills on this same

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issue.

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And internationally, the UK, Australia,

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Brazil,

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and other countries around the world are

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already implementing age verification

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mandates.

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But while these mandates are framed as

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online safety measures,

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they do more harm than good.

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And I'm really excited to have our panel

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today to discuss these harms and the human

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harms of these technologies.

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Because not only do they undermine free

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expression,

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they erode privacy and anonymity,

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they create new barriers to internet

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access and expose users to serious data

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security risks.

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And, of course,

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this will never stop at just adult content

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lawmakers are already proposing invasive

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age checks and ID checks for everything

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from social media to dating Apps Ai chat

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bots and even skincare products or diet

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supplements.

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So what begins as an age as as

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age verification to supposedly protect

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children online.

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quickly becomes a broad surveillance

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regime,

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one that reshapes how people of all ages

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will experience the internet.

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So to get us started on this discussion,

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Alexis,

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you've worked on age verification and

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digital ID technologies for a while now.

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Could you start us off by laying the

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groundwork of how age gating actually

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works in practice and relatedly,

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do these schemes actually work?

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Yes, I'd be glad to.

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With age gating,

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there's various methods that different

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platforms can adopt and they have.

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Usually age methods,

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age or age verification methods or age

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assurance methods will go through several

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different ways of verifying your identity

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or verifying your age, right?

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So if you look at it with the

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framework that they have built,

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they being age,

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policymakers who have implemented age

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verification it's framed around protecting

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the children right it's framed around

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keeping safe children safe online but when

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you actually look at the implementation

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it's more about platform compliance than

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it is about actually protecting children

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or keeping them safe online or even

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teaching them how to be safe online so

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if you look at it from a platform

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compliance aspect age gating is more

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beneficial from that angle than it is

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with actually setting out to do what the

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original intention was set out.

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When you look at different policymakers

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and how they frame this,

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it treats the user as a liability.

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It treats everyone who arrives at the

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platform as hostile to the platform and

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possibly a liability depending on their

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age,

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not necessarily protecting them because of

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their age, right?

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So if you look at it that way,

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where you're saying,

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does it protect children?

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Does it keep them safe online?

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No.

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Age gating does not do that,

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but it does help enhance platform

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compliance and shift liability.

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So the error margin for whether or not

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you get denied based off whatever method

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they use.

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And most of them have not been proven

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to be fully safe or fully private or

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fully protective of your data.

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If you look at it from that aspect,

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error margins are left to the user.

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So anything that denies you based off of

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it being wrong,

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whatever age verification method that they

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use, whether it be facial estimation,

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checking your ID,

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whether it be looking at different parts

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of your data or your age of your

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account or inferring your age,

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whatever method that they use,

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if it fails,

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that error margin lands on you as a

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user and the burden lies on you as

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the user and it shifts the liability away

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from the platform.

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when you are using age-gating methods.

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So framing it that way and looking at

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how it's been implemented,

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I see it as less and less about

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actually protecting the children,

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keeping them safe online,

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and more so about shifting blame,

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liability, and burden.

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Yeah, that's such a great point.

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I want to, Cynthia, ask you,

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you wrote a great piece for a user

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mag titled Who Age Verification Laws

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Really Benefit and How to Resist.

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And you describe age verification as a way

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to legislate morality,

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which I think is such a great way

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to put it.

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Can you unpack what that looks like in

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practice and who ultimately benefits from

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these laws and who bears the real cost?

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Yes, thank you, Ren,

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and thank you to EFF for inviting me

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to join this fantastic panel and

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discussion, important discussion today.

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Legislating morality was a phrase that I

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actually first encountered when I sat down

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for a conference session that was named

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Legislating Morality hosted by Age

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Verification.

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industry vendors and lobbyists.

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It was how they presented themselves.

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It was the promise that they were making

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and the conversation that they were hoping

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to start with people who were many of

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the people that were at this conference

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were government actors.

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And I think that when we sort of

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take a step back from the very confusing

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and very intense kind of technology-based

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conversations of what this is and how it

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works,

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and we think about the iterations of

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censorship that we have observed over the

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past, even just the past decade, right?

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The book bans across this country also

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started with a lot of vocal concerns about

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sexualized content.

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but then they expanded to include a lot

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more kinds of conversations about

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identity,

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whether that was identity that is gender,

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whether it's queer,

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whether it's based on even erasing entire

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aspects of our history,

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if they made kids feel uncomfortable

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was the argument that critical race theory

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and anything that mentioned slavery or

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made kids feel bad needed to also be

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erased.

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These types of attempts to use the law

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and use operations through the law to push

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other people's morality on us all are not

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new.

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And they also go back

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centuries to obscenity laws.

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And for example,

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Anthony Comstock famously was a vocal

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activist for pushing censorship in health

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care and prohibited, for example,

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the use of media to distribute or inform

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people about abortion back in the eighteen

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hundreds.

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And so this is not a new practice.

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Legislating morality is not a new game or

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goal from

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many people who see the opportunity of

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getting access to the state,

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whether it is to state laws or whether

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00:11:54,839 --> 00:11:56,299
it is to state operations.

286
00:11:56,340 --> 00:11:59,662
And what I think that these technologies

287
00:11:59,761 --> 00:12:03,245
really have the potential and the danger

288
00:12:03,284 --> 00:12:05,725
to do is import other people's morality

289
00:12:05,765 --> 00:12:07,607
without going through public legislative

290
00:12:07,648 --> 00:12:12,291
processes because they are so technically

291
00:12:12,410 --> 00:12:14,852
inaccessible as a conversation for many

292
00:12:14,893 --> 00:12:15,192
people.

293
00:12:17,625 --> 00:12:19,145
Yeah, that's such a great point.

294
00:12:19,166 --> 00:12:21,288
I think also that makes me think of

295
00:12:21,327 --> 00:12:24,289
how a lot of these laws in the

296
00:12:24,409 --> 00:12:26,692
US have a civil right of action so

297
00:12:26,731 --> 00:12:29,212
that in that way it is legislating other

298
00:12:29,254 --> 00:12:30,193
people's morals.

299
00:12:30,234 --> 00:12:32,615
If you find something objectionable,

300
00:12:32,655 --> 00:12:34,898
you could go ahead and sue a content

301
00:12:34,918 --> 00:12:35,298
provider.

302
00:12:36,365 --> 00:12:37,787
So that's such a great point.

303
00:12:38,587 --> 00:12:38,807
Hannah,

304
00:12:38,827 --> 00:12:40,168
I'd love to talk to you a little

305
00:12:40,188 --> 00:12:42,751
bit about your work at Gen Z for

306
00:12:42,831 --> 00:12:43,312
Change.

307
00:12:43,932 --> 00:12:45,394
How have young people actually been

308
00:12:45,413 --> 00:12:47,996
included or excluded from conversations

309
00:12:48,037 --> 00:12:50,519
about age verification and online safety?

310
00:12:51,399 --> 00:12:54,202
And what do these laws mean for LGBTQ

311
00:12:54,243 --> 00:12:55,703
youth and for young people seeking

312
00:12:55,744 --> 00:12:57,745
information about reproductive or

313
00:12:57,785 --> 00:12:59,268
gender-affirming care, for example?

314
00:13:00,120 --> 00:13:00,860
Yeah,

315
00:13:00,880 --> 00:13:03,283
this is a really big kind of area

316
00:13:03,582 --> 00:13:07,807
and point of contention that differs

317
00:13:07,827 --> 00:13:09,548
between young people and the lawmakers

318
00:13:09,609 --> 00:13:11,831
behind these sort of age verification

319
00:13:11,890 --> 00:13:12,652
policies.

320
00:13:13,633 --> 00:13:14,754
I guess to start off,

321
00:13:15,634 --> 00:13:17,336
working in the youth and advocacy

322
00:13:17,856 --> 00:13:18,797
space online.

323
00:13:19,577 --> 00:13:21,498
I see time and time again that young

324
00:13:21,538 --> 00:13:24,519
people are often invoked as the reason for

325
00:13:24,558 --> 00:13:26,320
these laws, like Alexis mentions,

326
00:13:26,399 --> 00:13:28,419
but are rarely a part of the

327
00:13:28,460 --> 00:13:30,561
decision-making process and designing and

328
00:13:30,581 --> 00:13:32,201
developing them, you know,

329
00:13:32,221 --> 00:13:33,042
collaboratively.

330
00:13:33,682 --> 00:13:35,783
In the rare occurrence that that does

331
00:13:35,844 --> 00:13:36,384
happen,

332
00:13:38,044 --> 00:13:42,288
often those sorts of policies tend to harm

333
00:13:42,308 --> 00:13:45,610
and impact young people in the foster care

334
00:13:45,630 --> 00:13:46,932
system, for example, the most,

335
00:13:47,011 --> 00:13:48,373
or without stable guardianship.

336
00:13:48,513 --> 00:13:51,775
I think that's the first,

337
00:13:52,275 --> 00:13:53,616
to address the first half of that question

338
00:13:53,657 --> 00:13:55,498
of young people are actually excluded from

339
00:13:55,518 --> 00:13:57,879
this conversation despite these policies

340
00:13:57,960 --> 00:13:59,301
being targeted for them.

341
00:14:01,500 --> 00:14:06,184
And in these practices and policies,

342
00:14:06,485 --> 00:14:09,567
the platforms prevent, would ultimately,

343
00:14:09,587 --> 00:14:11,509
like Cynthia mentions,

344
00:14:11,549 --> 00:14:14,393
would enrich on young people from

345
00:14:14,514 --> 00:14:15,134
accessing,

346
00:14:16,995 --> 00:14:19,357
they market it as it's going to prevent

347
00:14:19,399 --> 00:14:21,159
them from accessing quote unquote adult

348
00:14:21,200 --> 00:14:22,642
content, but as we've seen,

349
00:14:24,172 --> 00:14:26,533
the the definition and the growth of what

350
00:14:26,572 --> 00:14:28,774
that could include you know it tends to

351
00:14:28,914 --> 00:14:32,037
sweep up you know topics on sex education

352
00:14:32,096 --> 00:14:34,398
or mental health resources reproductive

353
00:14:34,437 --> 00:14:38,100
health and so much more um and that

354
00:14:38,139 --> 00:14:40,321
sort of content is rel you know relatively

355
00:14:40,341 --> 00:14:42,221
important given that the states who have

356
00:14:42,442 --> 00:14:44,864
implemented some of these laws um you know

357
00:14:44,884 --> 00:14:46,144
those schools fail to provide

358
00:14:46,184 --> 00:14:49,586
comprehensive sex education or um you know

359
00:14:50,441 --> 00:14:50,640
you know,

360
00:14:50,660 --> 00:14:52,562
young people using that content may not

361
00:14:52,602 --> 00:14:54,625
have family environments that are as

362
00:14:54,684 --> 00:14:57,327
supportive or affirming of their

363
00:14:57,388 --> 00:14:58,830
identities that Cynthia mentioned.

364
00:14:58,929 --> 00:15:01,812
So and then, you know,

365
00:15:01,852 --> 00:15:04,836
diving deeper into gender affirming and

366
00:15:04,916 --> 00:15:07,217
reproductive health care, you know,

367
00:15:07,238 --> 00:15:08,860
we've seen across the United States in

368
00:15:08,919 --> 00:15:11,422
particular of both forms of care being

369
00:15:11,481 --> 00:15:13,024
banned or criminalized and

370
00:15:14,580 --> 00:15:17,101
if you're prompted to show ID or some

371
00:15:17,142 --> 00:15:20,325
sort of age verification system in place,

372
00:15:20,485 --> 00:15:22,725
accessing that information is more

373
00:15:22,765 --> 00:15:26,469
dangerous than ever given the direct

374
00:15:27,250 --> 00:15:31,592
pipeline into your information that could

375
00:15:31,673 --> 00:15:32,974
harm you very,

376
00:15:33,173 --> 00:15:34,916
very directly and could punish you from

377
00:15:34,975 --> 00:15:37,398
even searching or wanting to access that

378
00:15:37,457 --> 00:15:38,238
sort of information.

379
00:15:38,278 --> 00:15:40,539
So I think treads into

380
00:15:42,110 --> 00:15:42,389
you know,

381
00:15:42,529 --> 00:15:45,751
a very scary pipeline of broader

382
00:15:45,812 --> 00:15:48,014
censorship of anything that challenges

383
00:15:48,073 --> 00:15:48,953
current, you know,

384
00:15:49,014 --> 00:15:51,174
political or cultural narratives.

385
00:15:52,556 --> 00:15:55,798
So I think, like, you know,

386
00:15:55,977 --> 00:15:58,259
it starts with the lack of young people

387
00:15:58,440 --> 00:16:00,321
not being in those, you know,

388
00:16:00,341 --> 00:16:02,481
sort of policy and decision making rooms

389
00:16:02,581 --> 00:16:03,682
and being excluded from those

390
00:16:03,702 --> 00:16:06,764
conversations, despite, you know,

391
00:16:06,845 --> 00:16:08,466
all of these policies targeting us.

392
00:16:09,889 --> 00:16:11,028
Yeah, that's such a great point.

393
00:16:11,188 --> 00:16:14,029
And it's kind of unfortunate

394
00:16:14,250 --> 00:16:16,350
disappointment that, you know,

395
00:16:16,370 --> 00:16:18,850
I had a colleague recently actually say

396
00:16:19,850 --> 00:16:21,250
this saying that I heard for the first

397
00:16:21,291 --> 00:16:21,431
time,

398
00:16:21,451 --> 00:16:22,750
but that the closer you are to the

399
00:16:22,811 --> 00:16:23,230
problem,

400
00:16:23,250 --> 00:16:24,731
the closer you are to the solution.

401
00:16:25,251 --> 00:16:28,091
And it's unfortunate that lawmakers have

402
00:16:28,131 --> 00:16:31,212
not taken the advantage of including young

403
00:16:31,253 --> 00:16:34,393
people in these conversations and thinking

404
00:16:34,994 --> 00:16:36,453
of solutions or how to

405
00:16:37,698 --> 00:16:39,479
yeah, how to talk about these issues.

406
00:16:39,578 --> 00:16:41,659
But I'd love to also talk to you

407
00:16:41,679 --> 00:16:42,659
a little bit about like,

408
00:16:42,679 --> 00:16:44,620
from a technologist perspective,

409
00:16:45,360 --> 00:16:48,841
how are young people already experiencing

410
00:16:48,880 --> 00:16:51,182
this increased surveillance and censorship

411
00:16:51,261 --> 00:16:51,782
online,

412
00:16:52,542 --> 00:16:54,642
especially around topics like Palestine or

413
00:16:54,662 --> 00:16:56,523
immigration and other issues?

414
00:16:57,243 --> 00:16:59,283
How do age verification and the related

415
00:16:59,322 --> 00:17:01,703
technologies amplify those harms that

416
00:17:01,744 --> 00:17:02,764
protect young users?

417
00:17:03,596 --> 00:17:04,237
Yeah,

418
00:17:04,257 --> 00:17:06,638
I'll focus in on around like social media

419
00:17:07,279 --> 00:17:09,182
when it comes to conversations on

420
00:17:09,241 --> 00:17:11,084
Palestine and immigration.

421
00:17:11,604 --> 00:17:12,625
At Gen Z for Change,

422
00:17:12,785 --> 00:17:15,788
a big core of our work is educating

423
00:17:15,888 --> 00:17:17,049
our young audience on

424
00:17:17,814 --> 00:17:19,775
core issues that affect us and working

425
00:17:19,815 --> 00:17:23,335
with content creators and influencers to

426
00:17:23,454 --> 00:17:24,695
educate their audiences.

427
00:17:24,776 --> 00:17:26,516
And time and time again, we've seen,

428
00:17:27,036 --> 00:17:28,977
especially with Palestine related content,

429
00:17:30,817 --> 00:17:32,096
posts are being shadow banned,

430
00:17:32,136 --> 00:17:34,877
accounts are being removed or blocked very

431
00:17:36,877 --> 00:17:42,319
unduly and almost like no content and

432
00:17:42,359 --> 00:17:43,220
views around

433
00:17:43,839 --> 00:17:46,000
you know particular subjects were being

434
00:17:46,020 --> 00:17:50,263
shadow banned and so um when you so

435
00:17:50,284 --> 00:17:51,825
that's like the first aspect to social

436
00:17:51,845 --> 00:17:53,806
media when it comes to already like you

437
00:17:53,826 --> 00:17:55,948
know politically charged conversations and

438
00:17:55,968 --> 00:17:59,710
then if you're adding um age verification

439
00:18:00,450 --> 00:18:03,271
um or any sort of like identity you

440
00:18:03,291 --> 00:18:04,792
know tracking technology on this

441
00:18:04,833 --> 00:18:08,894
environment um like specifically you know

442
00:18:08,915 --> 00:18:11,156
if it could be biometric data or

443
00:18:12,251 --> 00:18:13,894
anything adjacent, it could be,

444
00:18:14,134 --> 00:18:22,400
like I mentioned earlier.

445
00:18:22,559 --> 00:18:23,740
I think we lost you, Hannah.

446
00:18:23,780 --> 00:18:28,724
Yeah.

447
00:18:28,765 --> 00:18:30,205
Well, a lot to unpack, I think,

448
00:18:30,226 --> 00:18:32,347
when it comes to censorship already

449
00:18:32,387 --> 00:18:33,568
existing on social media,

450
00:18:33,608 --> 00:18:35,470
but then adding in, yeah,

451
00:18:35,650 --> 00:18:36,131
like I mentioned,

452
00:18:36,230 --> 00:18:39,133
one layer of age verification seems to

453
00:18:39,452 --> 00:18:41,095
just continuously

454
00:18:42,127 --> 00:18:44,490
know heighten the sort of harms associated

455
00:18:45,030 --> 00:18:46,811
um and i bring this up because uh

456
00:18:46,912 --> 00:18:48,192
you know the current you know trump

457
00:18:48,232 --> 00:18:49,615
administration in the united states has

458
00:18:49,674 --> 00:18:51,876
highlighted that social media activity and

459
00:18:51,896 --> 00:18:54,159
monitoring is a big step when it comes

460
00:18:54,199 --> 00:18:58,241
to um you know identifying people to you

461
00:18:58,261 --> 00:19:00,203
know penalize and you know to pour and

462
00:19:00,223 --> 00:19:01,105
things like that and so

463
00:19:01,785 --> 00:19:04,067
And, you know, seeing that firsthand,

464
00:19:04,446 --> 00:19:06,989
it's a little scary because as it relates

465
00:19:07,009 --> 00:19:08,829
to self-censoring and how we're

466
00:19:08,849 --> 00:19:10,810
approaching the Internet and how we're not

467
00:19:10,851 --> 00:19:13,313
just allowing these algorithms to,

468
00:19:14,292 --> 00:19:16,114
you know, define our experience online,

469
00:19:16,174 --> 00:19:17,654
but add in, you know,

470
00:19:17,816 --> 00:19:21,718
sort of state-sanctioned punishment and

471
00:19:21,738 --> 00:19:24,539
fear around it together really changes our

472
00:19:24,559 --> 00:19:27,821
experience online.

473
00:19:27,882 --> 00:19:28,281
Yeah, for sure.

474
00:19:28,321 --> 00:19:30,884
The chilling effect is very real on.

475
00:19:32,768 --> 00:19:35,169
how people experience the internet now.

476
00:19:35,888 --> 00:19:36,769
That's such a great point.

477
00:19:37,690 --> 00:19:40,191
One of the ways that age verification is

478
00:19:40,330 --> 00:19:40,631
done,

479
00:19:40,691 --> 00:19:43,231
one of the main ways is through government

480
00:19:43,332 --> 00:19:45,392
IDs and through, you know,

481
00:19:45,412 --> 00:19:47,653
you take a photo of your government ID

482
00:19:47,893 --> 00:19:50,314
or also there has been a lot of

483
00:19:50,374 --> 00:19:53,015
talk around digital IDs and those schemes

484
00:19:53,075 --> 00:19:53,454
and how

485
00:19:54,174 --> 00:19:56,317
they can integrate with age verification.

486
00:19:56,876 --> 00:19:57,837
And Cynthia and Alexis,

487
00:19:57,857 --> 00:19:59,939
you both have worked quite extensively on

488
00:20:00,199 --> 00:20:02,260
the move towards digital IDs and digital

489
00:20:02,320 --> 00:20:02,820
wallets.

490
00:20:03,602 --> 00:20:04,122
And Alexis,

491
00:20:04,162 --> 00:20:05,702
I'd love to go to you first from

492
00:20:05,722 --> 00:20:07,023
a technical perspective.

493
00:20:07,604 --> 00:20:09,846
How tightly do you see age verification

494
00:20:09,905 --> 00:20:12,386
schemes being now coupled with the broader

495
00:20:12,487 --> 00:20:13,728
digital ID system?

496
00:20:13,988 --> 00:20:15,308
And, you know,

497
00:20:15,328 --> 00:20:17,029
we've seen governments fast track digital

498
00:20:17,111 --> 00:20:19,112
ID by tying it to age verification.

499
00:20:19,664 --> 00:20:22,626
So how does that compare to earlier

500
00:20:22,707 --> 00:20:24,468
iterations of digital ID that you've

501
00:20:24,488 --> 00:20:25,428
worked on?

502
00:20:25,688 --> 00:20:26,788
And where are you seeing the most

503
00:20:26,868 --> 00:20:28,450
concerning scope creep there?

504
00:20:28,470 --> 00:20:30,089
Sure.

505
00:20:31,250 --> 00:20:33,892
So at the first iteration of digital ID,

506
00:20:34,393 --> 00:20:35,952
probably well over ten years ago,

507
00:20:36,394 --> 00:20:38,875
it was more so focused on national

508
00:20:38,954 --> 00:20:41,355
databases around biometric data in

509
00:20:41,395 --> 00:20:41,977
particular.

510
00:20:42,457 --> 00:20:44,498
You had fingerprint collection.

511
00:20:44,597 --> 00:20:46,699
You had other types of biometric data that

512
00:20:46,719 --> 00:20:48,339
could possibly be stored on a national

513
00:20:48,380 --> 00:20:48,579
level.

514
00:20:49,146 --> 00:20:52,228
in centralizing the ID of people within a

515
00:20:52,288 --> 00:20:53,669
certain context of a country.

516
00:20:53,749 --> 00:20:56,590
So you'll have, like India is the most,

517
00:20:56,611 --> 00:20:57,631
I would say,

518
00:20:58,932 --> 00:21:01,073
reputable example of all of this,

519
00:21:01,113 --> 00:21:02,653
of the old guard digital identity.

520
00:21:03,433 --> 00:21:05,295
They've had several incidents since then

521
00:21:05,555 --> 00:21:08,115
of merging everyone's data together like

522
00:21:08,155 --> 00:21:10,196
that into a national database,

523
00:21:10,696 --> 00:21:12,097
health data,

524
00:21:12,538 --> 00:21:13,838
and then other types of data that could

525
00:21:13,858 --> 00:21:16,299
be potentially conflated with your

526
00:21:17,681 --> 00:21:18,300
national ID.

527
00:21:19,130 --> 00:21:20,910
And so even today,

528
00:21:20,970 --> 00:21:23,050
we still see remnants of that and

529
00:21:23,070 --> 00:21:26,931
proposals around national ID and merging

530
00:21:26,971 --> 00:21:28,592
that with biometric data.

531
00:21:29,491 --> 00:21:32,912
Then came the pandemic and everybody

532
00:21:32,932 --> 00:21:33,952
wanted to go digital.

533
00:21:34,012 --> 00:21:37,093
Everybody wanted to make sure that they

534
00:21:37,133 --> 00:21:39,732
are able to have some sort of credentials

535
00:21:40,034 --> 00:21:42,173
on the device of being able to display

536
00:21:42,193 --> 00:21:43,473
a certain kind of credential.

537
00:21:43,713 --> 00:21:44,473
During that time,

538
00:21:44,693 --> 00:21:47,894
it was there verifying that you had a

539
00:21:47,934 --> 00:21:48,595
vaccination.

540
00:21:49,240 --> 00:21:50,602
And that was contentious for various

541
00:21:50,662 --> 00:21:53,942
reasons because a lot of the technology

542
00:21:53,962 --> 00:21:55,344
that was being deployed then wasn't

543
00:21:55,364 --> 00:21:57,105
necessarily being pushed by public health

544
00:21:57,125 --> 00:21:58,924
officials.

545
00:21:59,026 --> 00:22:01,166
It wasn't considered helpful by public

546
00:22:01,186 --> 00:22:04,728
health officials to have necessarily a

547
00:22:05,208 --> 00:22:08,670
verified vaccine credential on your device

548
00:22:08,930 --> 00:22:10,471
in order to help public health.

549
00:22:11,290 --> 00:22:13,731
They were asking for things like PPE and

550
00:22:13,791 --> 00:22:15,212
more expanded healthcare.

551
00:22:15,634 --> 00:22:16,115
systems,

552
00:22:16,194 --> 00:22:18,557
but not necessarily a QR code to get

553
00:22:18,636 --> 00:22:19,376
into a building,

554
00:22:19,817 --> 00:22:21,137
whether or not you had a vaccine or

555
00:22:21,178 --> 00:22:21,397
not.

556
00:22:21,979 --> 00:22:23,338
But a lot of the players from that

557
00:22:23,378 --> 00:22:26,621
time have since then pivoted and saw the

558
00:22:26,661 --> 00:22:28,883
benefit of becoming a wallet or all

559
00:22:28,903 --> 00:22:31,584
encompassing ID wallet or digital wallet.

560
00:22:32,044 --> 00:22:34,306
So those players from that era and that

561
00:22:34,365 --> 00:22:36,326
time shifted, pivoted,

562
00:22:36,707 --> 00:22:39,848
and decided to promote themselves on

563
00:22:39,888 --> 00:22:41,549
device credentials, right?

564
00:22:41,589 --> 00:22:43,830
So having device bound credentials.

565
00:22:44,246 --> 00:22:46,145
And device bound can mean different things

566
00:22:46,185 --> 00:22:47,767
now in age verification land.

567
00:22:48,366 --> 00:22:50,946
A lot of people have various proposals

568
00:22:50,967 --> 00:22:51,906
around what that looks like.

569
00:22:51,967 --> 00:22:53,988
But with digital lighting in particular,

570
00:22:54,488 --> 00:22:56,107
what became popular, at least in the U.S.

571
00:22:56,127 --> 00:22:57,468
context, especially,

572
00:22:57,867 --> 00:22:59,108
is mobile driver's licenses.

573
00:22:59,729 --> 00:23:01,128
So mobile driver's licenses started to

574
00:23:01,189 --> 00:23:03,429
roll out in each state for various

575
00:23:03,469 --> 00:23:03,909
reasons.

576
00:23:03,989 --> 00:23:07,009
It was at first pushed through mechanisms

577
00:23:07,029 --> 00:23:07,710
like TSA,

578
00:23:08,210 --> 00:23:11,351
I believe the only institution right now

579
00:23:11,730 --> 00:23:13,250
accepting mobile driver's licenses

580
00:23:13,270 --> 00:23:13,750
wholesale.

581
00:23:14,324 --> 00:23:17,046
is TSA and even their technology to accept

582
00:23:17,205 --> 00:23:20,249
MDLs are very airport to airport,

583
00:23:20,308 --> 00:23:22,069
depending on what technology they have

584
00:23:22,111 --> 00:23:22,790
deployed there.

585
00:23:23,270 --> 00:23:27,315
But the MDL sort of is an example

586
00:23:27,434 --> 00:23:28,836
of a device bound credential.

587
00:23:29,396 --> 00:23:30,497
So if you lose that phone,

588
00:23:30,897 --> 00:23:33,059
you lose that mobile driver's license and

589
00:23:33,099 --> 00:23:34,820
you have to reprovision it with whatever

590
00:23:34,861 --> 00:23:36,501
DMV that you have gotten your original

591
00:23:36,541 --> 00:23:37,923
license from, right?

592
00:23:39,792 --> 00:23:40,252
At first,

593
00:23:40,292 --> 00:23:41,933
there was like a slow momentum towards it.

594
00:23:41,953 --> 00:23:44,733
There was like adoption and Apple and

595
00:23:44,773 --> 00:23:46,375
Google became on board.

596
00:23:46,434 --> 00:23:48,075
Some states had different implementations.

597
00:23:48,115 --> 00:23:49,375
The oldest implementation, I believe,

598
00:23:49,394 --> 00:23:50,015
is Louisiana.

599
00:23:50,496 --> 00:23:52,875
They had a around like two thousand

600
00:23:52,915 --> 00:23:54,477
sixteen to two thousand seventeen.

601
00:23:54,916 --> 00:23:56,616
They implemented their mobile driver's

602
00:23:56,656 --> 00:23:58,778
license and they've had several fiasco

603
00:23:58,798 --> 00:23:59,178
since then.

604
00:23:59,218 --> 00:24:01,438
But I do believe they started pushing even

605
00:24:01,478 --> 00:24:03,578
their iteration towards what we see today

606
00:24:03,798 --> 00:24:04,098
with.

607
00:24:05,292 --> 00:24:08,275
Apple and Google Wallet and provisioning a

608
00:24:08,375 --> 00:24:09,596
driver's license to that.

609
00:24:09,675 --> 00:24:12,136
So that became the framework in the US

610
00:24:12,156 --> 00:24:16,200
context for a digital ID on device in

611
00:24:16,240 --> 00:24:16,839
your wallet.

612
00:24:18,020 --> 00:24:19,701
And there's different arguments around how

613
00:24:19,761 --> 00:24:21,002
safe or secure that is.

614
00:24:21,644 --> 00:24:22,304
Generally,

615
00:24:22,364 --> 00:24:24,664
it's treated as a secure context on your

616
00:24:24,705 --> 00:24:25,165
phone.

617
00:24:25,685 --> 00:24:27,707
So that way it's not shared across cloud

618
00:24:27,747 --> 00:24:28,208
services,

619
00:24:28,387 --> 00:24:31,890
but digital ID being shared online,

620
00:24:32,230 --> 00:24:33,151
that's a different story.

621
00:24:33,811 --> 00:24:35,333
So we were pivoting,

622
00:24:35,413 --> 00:24:36,814
we're expanding the scope of what that

623
00:24:36,854 --> 00:24:37,273
means.

624
00:24:38,134 --> 00:24:40,236
And that's where age verification became

625
00:24:41,135 --> 00:24:45,159
very pointed as a topic to propel as

626
00:24:45,199 --> 00:24:48,141
a catalyst to keep promoting digital ID

627
00:24:49,000 --> 00:24:50,961
and sharing that online as a very new

628
00:24:51,001 --> 00:24:51,682
context.

629
00:24:52,262 --> 00:24:54,243
I pull out my ID in the US,

630
00:24:55,464 --> 00:24:57,165
I'm not sure how many times a month,

631
00:24:57,306 --> 00:24:59,686
probably I can count on one hand and

632
00:24:59,826 --> 00:25:02,108
you would possibly purchase alcohol.

633
00:25:02,805 --> 00:25:03,665
cigarettes,

634
00:25:05,007 --> 00:25:06,667
pick up your prescription medication.

635
00:25:07,269 --> 00:25:09,871
So at most a couple times a month.

636
00:25:10,391 --> 00:25:12,492
But with this new scheme of digital ID

637
00:25:12,512 --> 00:25:13,473
and age verification,

638
00:25:14,013 --> 00:25:17,416
that goes from maybe showing your ID once

639
00:25:17,457 --> 00:25:21,619
or twice to frequently turning everyone

640
00:25:21,680 --> 00:25:24,321
online into a verifier.

641
00:25:25,502 --> 00:25:29,346
And looking at that scope and looking at

642
00:25:29,386 --> 00:25:30,567
that amount of data sharing,

643
00:25:31,228 --> 00:25:32,388
there's different ways that

644
00:25:32,930 --> 00:25:34,790
different players have decided to say, oh,

645
00:25:34,830 --> 00:25:35,431
this is secure.

646
00:25:35,451 --> 00:25:35,971
Don't worry.

647
00:25:36,090 --> 00:25:37,172
We've found secure,

648
00:25:37,811 --> 00:25:40,432
cryptographically fancy ways to share your

649
00:25:40,833 --> 00:25:41,594
age online.

650
00:25:41,653 --> 00:25:43,594
So not necessarily the ID itself,

651
00:25:43,954 --> 00:25:45,375
but just the age threshold.

652
00:25:45,434 --> 00:25:46,736
And people will talk about it in a

653
00:25:46,776 --> 00:25:48,856
more private context that way.

654
00:25:49,396 --> 00:25:50,136
And that is true.

655
00:25:50,176 --> 00:25:51,317
There's ways to do that.

656
00:25:51,438 --> 00:25:53,739
But there's still this expanded scope that

657
00:25:53,798 --> 00:25:54,439
exists.

658
00:25:55,439 --> 00:25:57,099
Sharing your ID online is completely

659
00:25:57,140 --> 00:26:00,761
different than me showing my ID to my

660
00:26:00,781 --> 00:26:01,301
pharmacist.

661
00:26:02,063 --> 00:26:04,844
And a lot of proponents tend to glaze

662
00:26:04,903 --> 00:26:08,826
over that and ignore the expanded scope

663
00:26:08,905 --> 00:26:10,506
and the fact that it's burdening the

664
00:26:10,546 --> 00:26:12,807
entire public to be able to browse the

665
00:26:12,826 --> 00:26:15,307
web online and use it as we do

666
00:26:15,347 --> 00:26:15,748
today.

667
00:26:16,449 --> 00:26:18,449
So that part of digital ID,

668
00:26:18,469 --> 00:26:22,711
we have definitely seen get rushed.

669
00:26:23,010 --> 00:26:24,311
There's a couple of like standards and

670
00:26:24,352 --> 00:26:25,491
everything that have gotten rushed.

671
00:26:25,731 --> 00:26:27,113
Implementation has been rushed.

672
00:26:27,833 --> 00:26:29,673
So in order to

673
00:26:30,321 --> 00:26:34,507
satisfy age verification requirements yeah

674
00:26:35,248 --> 00:26:38,090
that that is really i think a point

675
00:26:38,111 --> 00:26:40,353
that i just started thinking about is i

676
00:26:40,373 --> 00:26:42,915
feel like no matter how secure and private

677
00:26:43,355 --> 00:26:46,179
these technologies end up being there is a

678
00:26:46,219 --> 00:26:49,001
there is a creepy sense of it of

679
00:26:49,082 --> 00:26:52,185
like have like giving your id to to

680
00:26:52,586 --> 00:26:55,508
Twitter or Facebook, or even worse,

681
00:26:55,988 --> 00:26:58,148
uploading a scan of your ID every time

682
00:26:58,189 --> 00:26:59,849
you go to watch porn.

683
00:27:00,830 --> 00:27:04,332
And I think that's why a really,

684
00:27:05,032 --> 00:27:06,973
I think, interesting stat came out.

685
00:27:07,034 --> 00:27:08,994
When Louisiana implemented their age

686
00:27:09,015 --> 00:27:09,914
verification law,

687
00:27:09,934 --> 00:27:11,256
they were one of the first states to

688
00:27:11,316 --> 00:27:13,636
implement that law.

689
00:27:14,917 --> 00:27:21,080
They had Pornhub implement the LA license

690
00:27:23,117 --> 00:27:26,460
like a way to prove your identity.

691
00:27:26,900 --> 00:27:29,240
And they saw an eighty percent decrease in

692
00:27:29,300 --> 00:27:31,821
traffic to their site because people

693
00:27:31,902 --> 00:27:33,883
realize that that's that's weird and

694
00:27:33,903 --> 00:27:34,222
creepy.

695
00:27:34,242 --> 00:27:35,364
And I don't want to upload my ID

696
00:27:35,384 --> 00:27:35,824
to to

697
00:27:36,558 --> 00:27:37,539
see that content.

698
00:27:38,079 --> 00:27:40,221
And it makes you wonder of like,

699
00:27:40,301 --> 00:27:44,265
where did those people go to find that

700
00:27:44,285 --> 00:27:45,625
content that they were looking for?

701
00:27:46,126 --> 00:27:47,847
And yeah,

702
00:27:47,928 --> 00:27:49,548
it's just interesting that no matter how

703
00:27:49,990 --> 00:27:53,571
private and secure and yeah,

704
00:27:54,012 --> 00:27:55,094
like that the vendors,

705
00:27:56,548 --> 00:27:58,911
all their talking points,

706
00:27:59,490 --> 00:28:02,933
there's still that deep down creepy

707
00:28:02,973 --> 00:28:05,214
feeling of showing your ID multiple times

708
00:28:05,234 --> 00:28:06,455
a day, multiple times a week.

709
00:28:07,596 --> 00:28:09,357
But I'd love to talk about the vendors

710
00:28:09,377 --> 00:28:10,538
with you, Cynthia, a little bit.

711
00:28:10,558 --> 00:28:13,141
You've written and you've spoken about how

712
00:28:13,240 --> 00:28:16,083
digital ID systems have been promoted by

713
00:28:16,143 --> 00:28:18,824
tech vendors and state governments as a

714
00:28:18,884 --> 00:28:20,945
convenient and a necessary solution.

715
00:28:21,425 --> 00:28:23,606
for accessing both private and more

716
00:28:23,666 --> 00:28:25,406
recently public services.

717
00:28:26,247 --> 00:28:28,488
So as government roll out digital ID and

718
00:28:28,627 --> 00:28:30,028
age verification schemes,

719
00:28:30,628 --> 00:28:32,709
we're also seeing this growing ecosystem

720
00:28:32,749 --> 00:28:35,509
of vendors and even more third parties

721
00:28:35,829 --> 00:28:37,891
handling all of that sensitive data.

722
00:28:38,290 --> 00:28:40,411
What concerns you the most about how this

723
00:28:40,431 --> 00:28:43,612
data is contracted, controlled, reused,

724
00:28:43,711 --> 00:28:44,612
shared, sold,

725
00:28:45,292 --> 00:28:47,032
especially when accountability is

726
00:28:47,093 --> 00:28:49,094
fragmented across so many private and

727
00:28:49,134 --> 00:28:49,913
public actors?

728
00:28:51,416 --> 00:28:51,717
Yes,

729
00:28:51,836 --> 00:28:55,961
my number one concern is exactly as Alexa

730
00:28:56,001 --> 00:28:56,342
said,

731
00:28:56,821 --> 00:29:01,967
the relationship that we all have to the

732
00:29:02,307 --> 00:29:04,769
public documentation that validates and

733
00:29:04,789 --> 00:29:07,011
verifies our identity is drastically

734
00:29:07,071 --> 00:29:11,296
changing when it is digitized and yet it

735
00:29:11,497 --> 00:29:12,678
is still being

736
00:29:13,257 --> 00:29:17,117
discussed and explained to members of the

737
00:29:17,157 --> 00:29:20,460
public as if it was merely the equivalent

738
00:29:20,539 --> 00:29:22,560
of taking like a photograph of your

739
00:29:22,601 --> 00:29:25,781
physical id and having you know like it

740
00:29:25,902 --> 00:29:28,663
bookmarked on an app in your phone and

741
00:29:28,863 --> 00:29:33,164
the infrastructure that is required in

742
00:29:33,325 --> 00:29:35,484
order to verify your identity that

743
00:29:35,545 --> 00:29:36,486
collects your

744
00:29:37,773 --> 00:29:40,395
identifying credentials that collects the

745
00:29:40,476 --> 00:29:43,096
verifiers credentials that connects those

746
00:29:43,156 --> 00:29:44,919
two in the moment in time you are

747
00:29:45,398 --> 00:29:47,819
showing them the infrastructure that

748
00:29:47,880 --> 00:29:50,201
requires and by the way the amount of

749
00:29:50,301 --> 00:29:55,025
information that um is collected and

750
00:29:55,105 --> 00:29:59,448
stored and potentially exposed as a result

751
00:30:00,490 --> 00:30:03,310
are not parts of the conversation and the

752
00:30:03,351 --> 00:30:07,152
way that the public is left out of

753
00:30:07,332 --> 00:30:11,233
the very drastic change that we will all

754
00:30:11,314 --> 00:30:14,855
experience as our identities as as our

755
00:30:14,894 --> 00:30:17,195
driver's licenses for example are

756
00:30:17,675 --> 00:30:20,356
fundamentally changed this all these

757
00:30:20,376 --> 00:30:22,337
changes are happening not in

758
00:30:23,038 --> 00:30:24,019
public forums,

759
00:30:24,239 --> 00:30:26,681
very few state legislators have actually

760
00:30:26,760 --> 00:30:31,644
taken up the challenges of really thinking

761
00:30:31,684 --> 00:30:35,067
through what it means to digitize our

762
00:30:35,127 --> 00:30:36,788
identity and how that changes our

763
00:30:36,808 --> 00:30:38,029
relationship to government,

764
00:30:38,089 --> 00:30:39,971
how it is at the same time that

765
00:30:40,011 --> 00:30:42,413
we are all becoming aware of how

766
00:30:43,013 --> 00:30:47,037
commercial data brokers have exposed and

767
00:30:47,076 --> 00:30:50,699
made our vast amounts of location data and

768
00:30:51,019 --> 00:30:52,641
financial transaction data and

769
00:30:52,681 --> 00:30:54,882
communications data more accessible to

770
00:30:54,961 --> 00:30:56,423
more people at the same time that we're

771
00:30:56,462 --> 00:30:58,765
becoming aware of the commercial threat

772
00:30:58,904 --> 00:31:02,007
and legislation is bubbling around about

773
00:31:02,086 --> 00:31:05,308
privacy in regards to how private vendors

774
00:31:05,709 --> 00:31:07,770
must regard our data.

775
00:31:08,231 --> 00:31:11,154
The government is building the plumbing to

776
00:31:11,414 --> 00:31:14,337
collect it directly itself and I think

777
00:31:14,377 --> 00:31:19,063
that the disconnect between our awareness

778
00:31:19,303 --> 00:31:22,326
of the commercial threat and the

779
00:31:22,385 --> 00:31:24,407
willingness to let the same commercial

780
00:31:24,428 --> 00:31:25,028
vendors

781
00:31:26,273 --> 00:31:29,256
be government vendors who are creating the

782
00:31:29,296 --> 00:31:32,317
exact or very similar kinds of

783
00:31:32,837 --> 00:31:35,619
infrastructure without the regulation,

784
00:31:35,640 --> 00:31:37,181
without public participation,

785
00:31:37,221 --> 00:31:38,582
without public debate.

786
00:31:39,561 --> 00:31:40,103
And rather,

787
00:31:40,742 --> 00:31:42,983
this is all happening inside of very

788
00:31:43,044 --> 00:31:45,365
opaque procurement processes that happen

789
00:31:45,405 --> 00:31:47,787
in government that is very difficult for

790
00:31:47,807 --> 00:31:49,288
the public to be engaged in.

791
00:31:51,027 --> 00:31:53,589
nearly impossible sometimes to learn about

792
00:31:53,691 --> 00:31:56,233
how these procurement projects are

793
00:31:56,294 --> 00:31:56,974
initiated.

794
00:31:57,655 --> 00:32:01,240
Our organization was founded as the New

795
00:32:01,260 --> 00:32:05,005
York City Municipal ID was in the midst

796
00:32:05,266 --> 00:32:07,888
of an RFP for digitization.

797
00:32:08,630 --> 00:32:12,771
And our founder was engaged in a lot

798
00:32:12,791 --> 00:32:14,751
of the original conversations around the

799
00:32:14,791 --> 00:32:16,373
creation of the municipal ID,

800
00:32:16,393 --> 00:32:18,854
which was called for by a lot of

801
00:32:19,054 --> 00:32:21,134
immigrant communities,

802
00:32:21,194 --> 00:32:22,214
by homeless communities,

803
00:32:22,275 --> 00:32:25,076
by people who were needing an additional

804
00:32:25,155 --> 00:32:26,436
type of identity.

805
00:32:27,037 --> 00:32:29,857
But under the de Blasio administration,

806
00:32:29,877 --> 00:32:34,480
a project was initiated that invited

807
00:32:35,628 --> 00:32:39,943
corporate vendors to propose digitization

808
00:32:39,983 --> 00:32:41,710
process for this municipal ID.

809
00:32:42,866 --> 00:32:45,008
We only found out about that process

810
00:32:45,067 --> 00:32:47,749
through the news because the opacity

811
00:32:47,808 --> 00:32:50,329
surrounding procurement really prevented

812
00:32:50,369 --> 00:32:51,151
public engagement.

813
00:32:51,211 --> 00:32:51,330
Now,

814
00:32:51,451 --> 00:32:54,211
once the coalition that fought for the

815
00:32:54,231 --> 00:32:56,573
municipal ID was engaged and was aware,

816
00:32:56,593 --> 00:32:59,013
you can read about it on our website,

817
00:32:59,054 --> 00:33:00,434
the campaign that it involved,

818
00:33:01,494 --> 00:33:03,976
we did successfully push back against that

819
00:33:04,016 --> 00:33:04,756
digitization,

820
00:33:04,816 --> 00:33:06,836
preserved the ability of New Yorkers to

821
00:33:06,896 --> 00:33:07,958
purchase, for example,

822
00:33:08,698 --> 00:33:10,318
transit rides with cash,

823
00:33:11,683 --> 00:33:13,904
And we have continued to really pay

824
00:33:13,944 --> 00:33:16,865
attention to the way that very quiet

825
00:33:16,925 --> 00:33:19,166
projects of government procurement are

826
00:33:19,207 --> 00:33:22,327
excluding and erasing public debate around

827
00:33:22,387 --> 00:33:24,669
these digital public infrastructure

828
00:33:24,709 --> 00:33:26,628
projects that will fundamentally change

829
00:33:26,648 --> 00:33:27,990
how we relate to each other and the

830
00:33:28,029 --> 00:33:28,529
government,

831
00:33:28,890 --> 00:33:31,010
but without the kind of democratic public

832
00:33:31,050 --> 00:33:33,612
participation that we might expect.

833
00:33:38,472 --> 00:33:40,816
Oh, no, Rin, you're muted.

834
00:33:40,855 --> 00:33:42,636
Sorry.

835
00:33:42,798 --> 00:33:43,577
That's a great point.

836
00:33:43,678 --> 00:33:46,221
And I think that you mentioned the irony

837
00:33:46,240 --> 00:33:46,621
there,

838
00:33:47,082 --> 00:33:50,986
how lawmakers a lot argue that platforms

839
00:33:51,066 --> 00:33:52,728
can't be trusted to keep kids safe,

840
00:33:52,748 --> 00:33:54,769
but those are the same vendors.

841
00:33:54,809 --> 00:33:57,752
The governments are in bed and relying on

842
00:33:57,813 --> 00:33:59,894
the same tech companies and vendors to

843
00:33:59,934 --> 00:34:01,396
verify everyone's identities.

844
00:34:02,221 --> 00:34:03,782
And I find that really interesting.

845
00:34:04,482 --> 00:34:06,364
Alexis, from your vantage point,

846
00:34:06,483 --> 00:34:09,545
does this actually improve security or

847
00:34:09,585 --> 00:34:10,045
trust,

848
00:34:10,106 --> 00:34:13,847
having vendors be the same tech companies,

849
00:34:13,947 --> 00:34:16,130
or does it just multiply the number of

850
00:34:16,190 --> 00:34:18,650
systems that can fail?

851
00:34:18,751 --> 00:34:18,891
Yeah,

852
00:34:18,931 --> 00:34:21,431
so when you look at what Cynthia was

853
00:34:21,452 --> 00:34:21,972
talking about,

854
00:34:21,992 --> 00:34:23,353
like that procurement process,

855
00:34:23,413 --> 00:34:25,954
a lot of that does go without a

856
00:34:26,014 --> 00:34:27,396
lot of public transparency.

857
00:34:27,416 --> 00:34:28,536
And I think that's one of the biggest

858
00:34:28,596 --> 00:34:29,996
issues that a lot of,

859
00:34:31,393 --> 00:34:33,434
that public civic process doesn't get

860
00:34:33,494 --> 00:34:35,034
involved early enough.

861
00:34:35,355 --> 00:34:36,514
And then it gets implemented,

862
00:34:36,635 --> 00:34:37,835
a vendor is already chosen.

863
00:34:38,494 --> 00:34:40,735
And then a pilot comes out with a

864
00:34:40,795 --> 00:34:42,096
potential vendor in mind.

865
00:34:42,795 --> 00:34:46,496
So what ends up happening here is I've

866
00:34:46,516 --> 00:34:49,797
seen in the age verification space where a

867
00:34:49,858 --> 00:34:53,557
lot of the same platforms that are being

868
00:34:53,597 --> 00:34:56,018
penned as harmful towards children,

869
00:34:57,119 --> 00:34:58,960
a lot of that is being pivoted towards

870
00:34:59,400 --> 00:35:01,179
still looking at big tech vendors,

871
00:35:01,842 --> 00:35:04,583
to implement some sort of form of age

872
00:35:04,623 --> 00:35:05,244
verification,

873
00:35:05,764 --> 00:35:07,505
as well as other companies and players as

874
00:35:07,565 --> 00:35:07,844
well.

875
00:35:07,925 --> 00:35:09,565
There's different standards involved.

876
00:35:10,025 --> 00:35:11,726
I won't get into too many details around

877
00:35:11,766 --> 00:35:12,047
that,

878
00:35:12,126 --> 00:35:13,686
but there's different standards and

879
00:35:13,726 --> 00:35:16,588
implementations around age verification

880
00:35:16,849 --> 00:35:17,849
that we have seen.

881
00:35:18,588 --> 00:35:21,869
And some can be ranked better than others

882
00:35:22,391 --> 00:35:24,431
in terms of how private it can and

883
00:35:24,451 --> 00:35:25,492
can't be, right?

884
00:35:26,760 --> 00:35:29,402
sharing a zero knowledge proof of my age

885
00:35:29,822 --> 00:35:33,065
is better than uploading my ID image

886
00:35:33,126 --> 00:35:33,786
wholesale.

887
00:35:34,527 --> 00:35:36,429
And so different age vendors and age

888
00:35:36,449 --> 00:35:39,150
verification methods have been able to

889
00:35:39,210 --> 00:35:41,713
incorporate whatever this process looks

890
00:35:41,753 --> 00:35:41,952
like.

891
00:35:41,972 --> 00:35:44,235
They often have multiple methods with one

892
00:35:44,275 --> 00:35:46,496
vendor, usually a liveliness check,

893
00:35:47,016 --> 00:35:48,577
facial estimation potentially,

894
00:35:49,438 --> 00:35:52,181
and then possibly relying on your digital

895
00:35:52,260 --> 00:35:52,501
ID.

896
00:35:52,521 --> 00:35:54,242
That could be like one implementation from

897
00:35:54,342 --> 00:35:54,882
one vendor.

898
00:35:55,463 --> 00:35:55,643
So

899
00:35:56,969 --> 00:35:58,210
the vendor is usually coming in with

900
00:35:58,451 --> 00:36:00,952
already a set amount of narratives of what

901
00:36:01,012 --> 00:36:04,373
works and the public doesn't get to debate

902
00:36:04,414 --> 00:36:04,713
that.

903
00:36:05,574 --> 00:36:07,496
And so that breaks down trust when you

904
00:36:07,536 --> 00:36:09,657
have that and you have to retroactively

905
00:36:09,697 --> 00:36:10,556
look at these things.

906
00:36:11,197 --> 00:36:13,619
And then you have it where creating a

907
00:36:13,679 --> 00:36:13,938
safer,

908
00:36:13,978 --> 00:36:16,400
more private web isn't necessarily the

909
00:36:16,440 --> 00:36:19,681
goal of age verification when it's getting

910
00:36:19,762 --> 00:36:20,302
implemented.

911
00:36:20,621 --> 00:36:23,003
And you have it where it's easier to

912
00:36:23,063 --> 00:36:23,503
implement

913
00:36:24,594 --> 00:36:26,434
age verification from a lot of platforms

914
00:36:26,454 --> 00:36:28,576
perspective than it is to actually create

915
00:36:28,596 --> 00:36:30,255
a safer, better web.

916
00:36:31,036 --> 00:36:32,956
It's an easy win from their perspective.

917
00:36:33,617 --> 00:36:35,458
It's saying, look, we're doing something.

918
00:36:35,639 --> 00:36:36,898
So for instance,

919
00:36:37,438 --> 00:36:39,940
you will have an open initiative where,

920
00:36:40,561 --> 00:36:40,760
you know,

921
00:36:40,800 --> 00:36:42,681
Google has presented a library to

922
00:36:42,802 --> 00:36:46,222
implement zero knowledge proofs in the

923
00:36:46,322 --> 00:36:49,764
European digital wallet implementation,

924
00:36:50,063 --> 00:36:50,364
right?

925
00:36:50,945 --> 00:36:51,184
But

926
00:36:51,724 --> 00:36:54,425
Google also has a large track record of

927
00:36:54,644 --> 00:36:56,585
other types of practices on the web that

928
00:36:56,606 --> 00:36:59,786
has been largely privacy violating and

929
00:36:59,947 --> 00:37:02,228
revenue conflicts and business conflicts

930
00:37:02,347 --> 00:37:04,708
on keeping people private online.

931
00:37:04,849 --> 00:37:06,230
Look at the track record with Chrome.

932
00:37:07,389 --> 00:37:09,791
They have many enhancements over the

933
00:37:09,831 --> 00:37:10,251
years,

934
00:37:10,371 --> 00:37:12,152
but then when it comes to the conversation

935
00:37:12,192 --> 00:37:14,172
of privacy, things got rolled back.

936
00:37:14,873 --> 00:37:16,094
Things had to be negotiated.

937
00:37:16,949 --> 00:37:19,110
in terms of like cookies and third-party

938
00:37:19,130 --> 00:37:21,652
cookies, sharing, tracking people online,

939
00:37:21,972 --> 00:37:24,494
the Google ads ecosystem and the problems

940
00:37:24,514 --> 00:37:25,335
that came with that.

941
00:37:25,835 --> 00:37:27,695
But now they get to say like, look,

942
00:37:27,976 --> 00:37:30,717
we are sharing this library.

943
00:37:30,757 --> 00:37:32,219
It's open, it's open source.

944
00:37:32,980 --> 00:37:34,521
And we're implementing age verification.

945
00:37:34,581 --> 00:37:35,581
We're making a better web.

946
00:37:36,242 --> 00:37:39,204
And they can sort of have this reputation

947
00:37:39,224 --> 00:37:42,385
building aspect where you can now say that

948
00:37:42,786 --> 00:37:44,427
you have tried to do something to keep

949
00:37:44,467 --> 00:37:45,068
people safe.

950
00:37:46,262 --> 00:37:48,985
rather than focusing on other aspects of

951
00:37:49,025 --> 00:37:50,146
keeping people safe online,

952
00:37:50,166 --> 00:37:53,108
is making it more private for everyone and

953
00:37:53,449 --> 00:37:54,929
doing something about corporate

954
00:37:54,949 --> 00:37:56,070
surveillance online.

955
00:37:56,851 --> 00:37:58,632
So with that said,

956
00:37:59,534 --> 00:38:01,596
a lot of this is not necessarily keeping

957
00:38:01,635 --> 00:38:03,036
children's data safer.

958
00:38:03,117 --> 00:38:06,340
That's not a feature of age verification.

959
00:38:07,121 --> 00:38:08,461
It doesn't really teach them how to be

960
00:38:08,521 --> 00:38:09,121
safe online.

961
00:38:09,862 --> 00:38:10,804
Kids will be online.

962
00:38:12,045 --> 00:38:13,106
How do they go about that?

963
00:38:14,322 --> 00:38:15,884
And how do they do that safely?

964
00:38:15,983 --> 00:38:17,264
Age verification doesn't really address

965
00:38:17,284 --> 00:38:17,985
that at all either.

966
00:38:18,445 --> 00:38:20,344
And then you'll have an expanded scope of

967
00:38:20,385 --> 00:38:21,806
data and sharing frequency.

968
00:38:21,925 --> 00:38:23,726
So there will be people that will say,

969
00:38:24,206 --> 00:38:25,567
this method is more private than that

970
00:38:25,606 --> 00:38:26,007
method.

971
00:38:26,246 --> 00:38:29,489
Or there's another initiative called Age

972
00:38:29,528 --> 00:38:29,909
Keys.

973
00:38:29,969 --> 00:38:31,309
I've noticed that it's being adopted

974
00:38:31,369 --> 00:38:33,909
recently by Meta and other major partners,

975
00:38:33,929 --> 00:38:34,269
right?

976
00:38:34,489 --> 00:38:35,771
And a lot of people are coming to

977
00:38:35,791 --> 00:38:37,090
me and say, look, we have better,

978
00:38:37,130 --> 00:38:37,972
safer technology.

979
00:38:37,992 --> 00:38:38,311
And I'm like,

980
00:38:38,331 --> 00:38:39,692
that's great that there's technologists

981
00:38:40,052 --> 00:38:42,012
actually working on safer aspects of

982
00:38:42,713 --> 00:38:43,813
sharing age online.

983
00:38:43,853 --> 00:38:44,494
But to me,

984
00:38:44,653 --> 00:38:46,655
there's still core issues and problems

985
00:38:46,695 --> 00:38:49,376
around core narratives about keeping kids

986
00:38:49,496 --> 00:38:52,275
actually safe that I'm seeing that get

987
00:38:52,315 --> 00:38:54,317
skipped over for the sake of saying that

988
00:38:54,356 --> 00:38:55,376
we look, we did a good,

989
00:38:55,697 --> 00:38:58,177
we did a thing and we solved it.

990
00:38:58,257 --> 00:38:59,157
Everybody go home.

991
00:38:59,257 --> 00:39:00,297
We have zero knowledge proofs.

992
00:39:00,358 --> 00:39:01,239
Everybody go home.

993
00:39:01,719 --> 00:39:02,798
We solved it, everyone.

994
00:39:03,458 --> 00:39:04,418
And it's kind of like, no,

995
00:39:04,478 --> 00:39:06,360
this is a new system being burdened onto

996
00:39:06,380 --> 00:39:07,179
the public still.

997
00:39:07,440 --> 00:39:08,679
We still need to talk about the scope.

998
00:39:09,179 --> 00:39:11,481
Mandatory age checks and the fact that

999
00:39:12,099 --> 00:39:12,338
you know,

1000
00:39:12,438 --> 00:39:15,282
it's taking the ability to be flexible

1001
00:39:15,382 --> 00:39:16,742
online and anonymous online,

1002
00:39:16,782 --> 00:39:18,824
taking that key pillar that EFF has fought

1003
00:39:18,844 --> 00:39:20,726
for and then admittedly online.

1004
00:39:21,365 --> 00:39:23,407
And now that's being treated as a bad

1005
00:39:23,427 --> 00:39:23,807
thing.

1006
00:39:23,827 --> 00:39:24,429
You know,

1007
00:39:24,528 --> 00:39:26,170
you can't be anonymous online anymore.

1008
00:39:26,210 --> 00:39:27,952
You need to have it tied or bound

1009
00:39:28,311 --> 00:39:31,074
to a real world aspect of yourself as

1010
00:39:31,114 --> 00:39:35,557
you go online and not seeing that as

1011
00:39:35,657 --> 00:39:35,938
being

1012
00:39:37,248 --> 00:39:38,909
being renegotiated in a sense,

1013
00:39:39,010 --> 00:39:41,751
that anonymity is now being traded off for

1014
00:39:41,791 --> 00:39:44,512
terms like pseudo-anonymity, right?

1015
00:39:44,793 --> 00:39:47,554
So you'll have that being taken away.

1016
00:39:48,275 --> 00:39:49,135
And to me,

1017
00:39:49,155 --> 00:39:52,916
that doesn't necessarily make things safer

1018
00:39:52,936 --> 00:39:54,697
when you're sharing more of yourself

1019
00:39:54,818 --> 00:39:55,237
online.

1020
00:39:57,298 --> 00:39:59,199
I love, as someone who works in

1021
00:39:59,934 --> 00:40:00,976
Public key cryptography,

1022
00:40:01,315 --> 00:40:03,277
I love the aspect of zero knowledge proofs

1023
00:40:03,318 --> 00:40:05,418
and I like seeing innovation like that.

1024
00:40:05,478 --> 00:40:06,699
But the fact that I'm seeing like these

1025
00:40:06,760 --> 00:40:08,981
innovations being used to share more about

1026
00:40:09,001 --> 00:40:09,782
myself online,

1027
00:40:10,163 --> 00:40:12,204
I find a lot of irony behind that

1028
00:40:12,744 --> 00:40:13,985
as someone excited about these

1029
00:40:14,025 --> 00:40:15,467
technologies at its core,

1030
00:40:15,547 --> 00:40:16,907
but I'm not excited about it being

1031
00:40:16,947 --> 00:40:18,728
implemented in the age verification space.

1032
00:40:19,309 --> 00:40:20,570
And that's what it's being promoted and

1033
00:40:20,690 --> 00:40:21,150
used for.

1034
00:40:21,231 --> 00:40:22,932
And that's necessarily about sharing less

1035
00:40:22,952 --> 00:40:25,233
about yourself online and being safer

1036
00:40:25,295 --> 00:40:25,695
online,

1037
00:40:25,775 --> 00:40:28,356
but sharing more about myself and more

1038
00:40:28,396 --> 00:40:29,797
frequently online.

1039
00:40:30,632 --> 00:40:32,052
just because there's a safe way to do

1040
00:40:32,112 --> 00:40:32,253
it.

1041
00:40:32,273 --> 00:40:33,333
Right.

1042
00:40:33,753 --> 00:40:34,532
Yeah.

1043
00:40:34,612 --> 00:40:37,894
And the other irony of also how most

1044
00:40:37,954 --> 00:40:39,775
of us growing up as children were told

1045
00:40:39,835 --> 00:40:41,695
to not talk to strangers online,

1046
00:40:41,735 --> 00:40:43,757
not to share your personal information

1047
00:40:43,817 --> 00:40:46,057
online and the ways that now age

1048
00:40:46,077 --> 00:40:48,818
verification mandates will desensitize a

1049
00:40:48,878 --> 00:40:51,780
whole, you know, generation of,

1050
00:40:52,000 --> 00:40:53,679
of people who think it's normal to,

1051
00:40:53,920 --> 00:40:56,101
to put your ID online and the ways

1052
00:40:56,141 --> 00:40:59,282
in which scamming will be even easier and,

1053
00:40:59,402 --> 00:40:59,702
and, and,

1054
00:41:00,762 --> 00:41:02,503
being able to get people's information

1055
00:41:02,523 --> 00:41:05,146
just because you're so used to giving up

1056
00:41:05,306 --> 00:41:07,887
all that information at every point of

1057
00:41:07,927 --> 00:41:09,407
your internet experience.

1058
00:41:10,568 --> 00:41:13,030
That's such an interesting irony.

1059
00:41:13,090 --> 00:41:15,010
And just quickly, Alexis,

1060
00:41:15,030 --> 00:41:16,411
you mentioned zero knowledge proofs.

1061
00:41:16,452 --> 00:41:18,072
For folks who don't know what those are,

1062
00:41:18,112 --> 00:41:20,173
can you give a quick explanation?

1063
00:41:20,233 --> 00:41:20,893
Yeah, sure.

1064
00:41:20,934 --> 00:41:21,594
Sorry about that.

1065
00:41:22,114 --> 00:41:23,496
I try to stay away from jargon.

1066
00:41:23,675 --> 00:41:24,655
But basically,

1067
00:41:24,735 --> 00:41:27,557
zero knowledge proofs are a cryptographic

1068
00:41:29,086 --> 00:41:30,327
way of sharing.

1069
00:41:30,527 --> 00:41:34,528
So using math to share your age threshold

1070
00:41:34,650 --> 00:41:36,210
in this context of age verification,

1071
00:41:37,110 --> 00:41:39,271
sharing something without revealing the

1072
00:41:39,291 --> 00:41:39,731
source.

1073
00:41:40,371 --> 00:41:44,673
So the source has been privately created,

1074
00:41:45,114 --> 00:41:47,335
and then I get to privately share some

1075
00:41:47,375 --> 00:41:50,155
information with you without sharing the

1076
00:41:50,235 --> 00:41:51,755
core of that information with you.

1077
00:41:51,795 --> 00:41:53,876
It's been verified in that sense,

1078
00:41:54,277 --> 00:41:55,097
cryptographically.

1079
00:41:55,177 --> 00:41:55,358
So

1080
00:41:56,036 --> 00:41:57,317
I get to share with you that I'm

1081
00:41:57,456 --> 00:41:59,436
over the age of twenty one without

1082
00:41:59,516 --> 00:42:01,538
necessarily revealing my birth date in

1083
00:42:01,577 --> 00:42:02,318
this context.

1084
00:42:02,978 --> 00:42:07,059
Zero knowledge proofs are considered sound

1085
00:42:08,201 --> 00:42:09,722
and it has a lot of research behind

1086
00:42:09,822 --> 00:42:09,902
it.

1087
00:42:10,942 --> 00:42:13,322
And I am glad to see more development

1088
00:42:13,342 --> 00:42:13,802
behind it.

1089
00:42:14,583 --> 00:42:16,764
But that is what that means in this

1090
00:42:16,824 --> 00:42:19,786
context of age verification is I'm able to

1091
00:42:19,806 --> 00:42:20,106
share.

1092
00:42:21,465 --> 00:42:23,666
That verified a piece of information about

1093
00:42:23,706 --> 00:42:25,648
myself without revealing said information.

1094
00:42:26,791 --> 00:42:27,192
Super helpful.

1095
00:42:27,351 --> 00:42:27,733
Thank you.

1096
00:42:27,853 --> 00:42:29,833
And for folks who want to learn more

1097
00:42:29,873 --> 00:42:32,594
about all of these technologies and how

1098
00:42:32,916 --> 00:42:34,536
different they are, how similar they are,

1099
00:42:34,657 --> 00:42:36,757
we do have a lot of breakdowns in

1100
00:42:36,858 --> 00:42:38,318
our age verification hub,

1101
00:42:38,539 --> 00:42:41,539
which you can visit at EFF.org slash age.

1102
00:42:42,041 --> 00:42:46,242
I'd love to switch a little bit back

1103
00:42:46,262 --> 00:42:46,983
to you, Hannah,

1104
00:42:47,423 --> 00:42:49,525
about reactions and responses to age

1105
00:42:49,545 --> 00:42:52,067
verification and these online safety laws.

1106
00:42:53,505 --> 00:42:56,228
How are young people, especially Gen Z,

1107
00:42:57,007 --> 00:42:58,349
responding to these laws?

1108
00:42:58,409 --> 00:43:00,331
And do you see more support, opposition,

1109
00:43:00,391 --> 00:43:02,992
or skepticism compared to older people?

1110
00:43:03,773 --> 00:43:04,994
And what do you think lawmakers are

1111
00:43:05,034 --> 00:43:07,677
consistently misunderstanding about how

1112
00:43:07,777 --> 00:43:09,539
young people experience the internet?

1113
00:43:11,027 --> 00:43:11,666
Yeah,

1114
00:43:11,686 --> 00:43:13,568
I think young people's responses

1115
00:43:13,608 --> 00:43:14,728
definitely vary.

1116
00:43:14,927 --> 00:43:15,867
I will say, of course,

1117
00:43:16,527 --> 00:43:18,929
we don't have one monolithic understanding

1118
00:43:18,989 --> 00:43:19,228
of it,

1119
00:43:19,289 --> 00:43:25,769
but I would say some young people's focus

1120
00:43:25,809 --> 00:43:27,831
around these policies could be described

1121
00:43:27,871 --> 00:43:29,891
as very cautious and skeptical,

1122
00:43:30,690 --> 00:43:31,431
like you mentioned,

1123
00:43:31,490 --> 00:43:33,132
especially compared to the older

1124
00:43:33,172 --> 00:43:33,891
generations.

1125
00:43:35,431 --> 00:43:37,952
I say this because I think young people

1126
00:43:37,992 --> 00:43:40,514
have firsthand seen how online harm is

1127
00:43:40,574 --> 00:43:40,853
real.

1128
00:43:40,893 --> 00:43:42,655
We deal with scams, harassment,

1129
00:43:42,795 --> 00:43:45,735
and exploitative platform design every

1130
00:43:45,775 --> 00:43:46,155
day.

1131
00:43:47,036 --> 00:43:49,416
But that's not exclusive or limited to

1132
00:43:49,538 --> 00:43:50,717
young people in Gen Z.

1133
00:43:51,057 --> 00:43:53,059
Every demographic that's online faces

1134
00:43:53,099 --> 00:43:56,320
scams and harassment as well and use

1135
00:43:56,480 --> 00:43:58,420
platforms with poor design practices.

1136
00:43:59,221 --> 00:44:01,041
There is a support for safety measures,

1137
00:44:01,061 --> 00:44:04,364
and I think that's where young people can

1138
00:44:04,423 --> 00:44:06,204
see the harmful harms of some of these

1139
00:44:06,244 --> 00:44:06,704
platforms.

1140
00:44:06,744 --> 00:44:08,746
But then there is a skepticism when the

1141
00:44:08,786 --> 00:44:11,387
solution ends up focusing more on

1142
00:44:11,447 --> 00:44:14,128
surveillance and data collection rather

1143
00:44:14,168 --> 00:44:17,771
than centering the actual safety that kind

1144
00:44:17,831 --> 00:44:19,351
of interests us in the first place.

1145
00:44:21,193 --> 00:44:22,673
And I think how lawmakers often

1146
00:44:22,693 --> 00:44:24,815
misunderstand that reality,

1147
00:44:24,876 --> 00:44:25,936
like I mentioned earlier,

1148
00:44:26,597 --> 00:44:28,139
when they're not talking to young people

1149
00:44:28,199 --> 00:44:29,460
and they're not consulting them and when

1150
00:44:29,480 --> 00:44:30,521
they're not, you know,

1151
00:44:30,601 --> 00:44:32,822
doing due diligence across, you know,

1152
00:44:32,842 --> 00:44:36,224
the board of young people in foster

1153
00:44:36,244 --> 00:44:38,827
systems and queer youth and everyone in

1154
00:44:38,867 --> 00:44:39,367
between.

1155
00:44:41,028 --> 00:44:43,210
you know, they often, you know,

1156
00:44:43,449 --> 00:44:45,050
lawmakers aren't able to process that the

1157
00:44:45,090 --> 00:44:47,911
internet still serves as an interconnected

1158
00:44:48,010 --> 00:44:49,692
space for learning and organizing and

1159
00:44:49,731 --> 00:44:51,733
finding community and mental health

1160
00:44:51,773 --> 00:44:53,652
resources and accessing critical

1161
00:44:53,672 --> 00:44:56,173
information for our everyday on social

1162
00:44:56,213 --> 00:44:56,673
media.

1163
00:44:58,434 --> 00:45:00,315
I often tell my, you know,

1164
00:45:01,195 --> 00:45:03,976
older family members that for us,

1165
00:45:03,996 --> 00:45:06,496
like TikTok and Instagram are how we watch

1166
00:45:06,536 --> 00:45:07,056
the news.

1167
00:45:07,097 --> 00:45:08,818
Like, you know, for, you know, we didn't,

1168
00:45:09,858 --> 00:45:11,780
We often get a lot of our learning

1169
00:45:11,820 --> 00:45:14,242
of everyday reality from those directly

1170
00:45:14,282 --> 00:45:15,342
reporting on the ground.

1171
00:45:15,402 --> 00:45:18,164
And so when that sort of option is

1172
00:45:18,244 --> 00:45:21,887
almost taken away or heavily surveilled,

1173
00:45:24,630 --> 00:45:29,353
lawmakers clearly have a big gap to fill

1174
00:45:29,534 --> 00:45:29,793
there.

1175
00:45:32,014 --> 00:45:33,916
And then I would say that one of

1176
00:45:33,956 --> 00:45:34,998
the through lines though,

1177
00:45:35,038 --> 00:45:36,880
through a lot of these conversations and

1178
00:45:36,981 --> 00:45:40,045
observations have been to hold some of

1179
00:45:40,065 --> 00:45:41,246
these platforms accountable.

1180
00:45:41,286 --> 00:45:41,467
You know,

1181
00:45:41,487 --> 00:45:43,128
we want transparency around our

1182
00:45:43,188 --> 00:45:43,869
experience.

1183
00:45:44,150 --> 00:45:46,072
The algorithms are always changing,

1184
00:45:46,112 --> 00:45:46,773
like I mentioned.

1185
00:45:47,494 --> 00:45:51,259
stronger protection against particular

1186
00:45:51,298 --> 00:45:54,061
scams and how our data is being used

1187
00:45:54,101 --> 00:45:56,264
and the consequences that come from

1188
00:45:56,324 --> 00:45:57,786
misusing that, if anything,

1189
00:45:57,826 --> 00:46:01,791
is what some Gen Z folks would want

1190
00:46:01,811 --> 00:46:02,911
more transparency on,

1191
00:46:03,351 --> 00:46:04,773
or young people would want transparency

1192
00:46:04,853 --> 00:46:04,914
on.

1193
00:46:06,695 --> 00:46:08,898
I think age verification,

1194
00:46:09,057 --> 00:46:11,559
like Alexis mentioned,

1195
00:46:12,139 --> 00:46:15,983
often takes responsibility away from the

1196
00:46:16,023 --> 00:46:17,923
social media and big tech platforms.

1197
00:46:18,784 --> 00:46:20,826
And then like Cynthia mentioned as well,

1198
00:46:20,865 --> 00:46:22,186
and then they're the same ones

1199
00:46:22,226 --> 00:46:25,349
implementing these sort of data heavy

1200
00:46:25,409 --> 00:46:29,371
solutions that make us uncomfortable.

1201
00:46:29,391 --> 00:46:31,253
And we've used the word creepy a lot

1202
00:46:31,273 --> 00:46:32,353
in our conversation today,

1203
00:46:32,373 --> 00:46:33,894
but it really is that reality.

1204
00:46:35,775 --> 00:46:36,056
So,

1205
00:46:36,637 --> 00:46:37,976
those are some of the gaps I've seen

1206
00:46:38,056 --> 00:46:39,898
I think from a young person's perspective

1207
00:46:39,918 --> 00:46:41,157
there's a lot to consider,

1208
00:46:41,557 --> 00:46:43,438
both on our experience, you know,

1209
00:46:43,539 --> 00:46:45,679
online but also what some of these new

1210
00:46:45,719 --> 00:46:47,221
policies could do not just for our

1211
00:46:47,280 --> 00:46:50,262
experience but for our like our data

1212
00:46:50,302 --> 00:46:52,141
double and what they're what they're using

1213
00:46:52,161 --> 00:46:53,443
there.

1214
00:46:53,543 --> 00:46:53,702
Yeah.

1215
00:46:54,630 --> 00:46:55,452
Such a great point.

1216
00:46:56,192 --> 00:46:56,793
To wrap us up,

1217
00:46:56,853 --> 00:46:58,494
I also want to ask you,

1218
00:46:58,514 --> 00:46:59,675
Cynthia and Alexis,

1219
00:47:00,275 --> 00:47:01,737
both of you come to this work not

1220
00:47:01,856 --> 00:47:03,699
only as experts in the issue,

1221
00:47:03,739 --> 00:47:05,539
but also as parents of young people.

1222
00:47:06,320 --> 00:47:09,563
So when the states answer to parenting

1223
00:47:09,643 --> 00:47:11,806
online as surveillance and restriction,

1224
00:47:12,166 --> 00:47:14,068
what alternatives do you think actually

1225
00:47:14,128 --> 00:47:14,507
work?

1226
00:47:14,889 --> 00:47:16,630
What tools, practices,

1227
00:47:16,690 --> 00:47:19,172
or values can parents rely on instead of

1228
00:47:19,853 --> 00:47:21,153
age verification mandates?

1229
00:47:26,769 --> 00:47:30,572
we're all navigating rather hostile

1230
00:47:30,612 --> 00:47:31,733
landscapes online.

1231
00:47:32,032 --> 00:47:33,594
And it, I think,

1232
00:47:33,833 --> 00:47:37,175
prepares young people more for this world

1233
00:47:37,235 --> 00:47:40,277
to have thorough, ongoing,

1234
00:47:40,456 --> 00:47:42,858
complicated conversations about what it

1235
00:47:42,898 --> 00:47:46,079
means to be discerning in this world,

1236
00:47:46,521 --> 00:47:49,902
to understand the motives of different

1237
00:47:49,961 --> 00:47:50,483
sources,

1238
00:47:51,302 --> 00:47:55,965
to understand how to research what the

1239
00:47:56,025 --> 00:47:58,646
source material is and understand it

1240
00:47:58,766 --> 00:48:00,027
inside of context.

1241
00:48:00,507 --> 00:48:02,807
I think so much of the information that

1242
00:48:02,847 --> 00:48:05,230
is delivered to us,

1243
00:48:05,250 --> 00:48:07,990
whether it is appearing as news on an

1244
00:48:08,070 --> 00:48:09,751
Instagram feed or whether it is

1245
00:48:10,751 --> 00:48:13,632
what we are searching a large browser for

1246
00:48:13,793 --> 00:48:17,233
and getting under what is called a news

1247
00:48:17,293 --> 00:48:20,094
category, regardless of where we are,

1248
00:48:20,534 --> 00:48:25,775
we have to understand that the groups that

1249
00:48:25,795 --> 00:48:27,956
are self-identifying as news giving are

1250
00:48:27,996 --> 00:48:33,998
not always without motives that make their

1251
00:48:34,237 --> 00:48:35,418
reporting less truthful.

1252
00:48:35,878 --> 00:48:36,739
And so I think that the

1253
00:48:38,280 --> 00:48:39,601
What I try to do,

1254
00:48:39,621 --> 00:48:41,682
what I think is most helpful to prepare

1255
00:48:41,702 --> 00:48:44,704
young people for this world is to sharpen

1256
00:48:44,905 --> 00:48:47,567
their tools of discernment so that they

1257
00:48:47,586 --> 00:48:50,989
can understand how something like age

1258
00:48:51,030 --> 00:48:53,612
verification, for example, is not,

1259
00:48:53,911 --> 00:48:55,253
as Alexis and Hannah said,

1260
00:48:55,393 --> 00:48:58,376
protecting them as much as it is

1261
00:48:59,987 --> 00:49:02,668
Yet another failure of us all to really

1262
00:49:02,748 --> 00:49:05,731
force tech companies to make more

1263
00:49:05,791 --> 00:49:08,012
responsible decisions on behalf of all of

1264
00:49:08,132 --> 00:49:10,373
us about how unhealthy,

1265
00:49:10,572 --> 00:49:14,793
about how driven to keep scrolling,

1266
00:49:14,994 --> 00:49:15,755
about how

1267
00:49:16,994 --> 00:49:19,476
absolutely free for all our data is.

1268
00:49:19,936 --> 00:49:21,836
And rather than address how this impacts

1269
00:49:21,996 --> 00:49:22,617
all of us,

1270
00:49:23,177 --> 00:49:25,197
another aspect of age verification laws

1271
00:49:25,237 --> 00:49:26,878
that I have a problem with is how

1272
00:49:27,039 --> 00:49:29,980
it really just takes the smallest possible

1273
00:49:30,019 --> 00:49:33,081
bite and has the impact of

1274
00:49:34,364 --> 00:49:36,846
of erasing young people's social network,

1275
00:49:36,985 --> 00:49:38,746
of erasing what might be a community of

1276
00:49:38,806 --> 00:49:40,728
support in a place where they don't have

1277
00:49:40,827 --> 00:49:42,728
access to a lot of supportive people.

1278
00:49:43,309 --> 00:49:46,012
It has the impact if anyone has ever

1279
00:49:46,472 --> 00:49:49,634
deleted your, just for example,

1280
00:49:49,693 --> 00:49:51,755
Twitter account and lost all those

1281
00:49:51,795 --> 00:49:53,416
contacts that you only had,

1282
00:49:53,516 --> 00:49:55,297
or you lost your history of

1283
00:49:56,117 --> 00:49:58,039
what was maybe like your daily journal.

1284
00:49:58,438 --> 00:50:00,621
Young people in Australia who have lost

1285
00:50:00,681 --> 00:50:03,461
access to social media overnight lost

1286
00:50:03,601 --> 00:50:06,403
access to communities that were supporting

1287
00:50:06,443 --> 00:50:06,684
them,

1288
00:50:06,844 --> 00:50:10,266
in addition to perhaps a few that were

1289
00:50:10,306 --> 00:50:12,126
protected from a harmful community.

1290
00:50:12,186 --> 00:50:15,708
But it is, I think, not being weighed

1291
00:50:16,108 --> 00:50:18,630
fairly in regards to people,

1292
00:50:18,929 --> 00:50:20,050
young people's futures,

1293
00:50:20,210 --> 00:50:23,072
as much as it is being driven by

1294
00:50:23,132 --> 00:50:25,853
companies as a way to make the smallest

1295
00:50:25,914 --> 00:50:30,195
type of regulation that will have as

1296
00:50:30,356 --> 00:50:32,137
little of an impact on their bottom line

1297
00:50:32,177 --> 00:50:35,757
as possible.

1298
00:50:36,018 --> 00:50:39,659
Alexis.

1299
00:50:39,699 --> 00:50:42,320
Yes, and to kind of reflect into that,

1300
00:50:42,501 --> 00:50:45,523
keeping the and considering

1301
00:50:45,885 --> 00:50:48,365
the environment around children and

1302
00:50:48,385 --> 00:50:50,547
considering something that's closer to

1303
00:50:50,586 --> 00:50:54,248
them and the institutions and help that

1304
00:50:54,268 --> 00:50:56,668
they have closer to them is probably a

1305
00:50:56,708 --> 00:50:58,268
better strategy than using techno

1306
00:50:58,309 --> 00:50:58,989
solutionism.

1307
00:50:59,630 --> 00:51:01,190
Techno solutionism is not a parenting

1308
00:51:01,210 --> 00:51:02,670
strategy in my eyes.

1309
00:51:03,351 --> 00:51:05,072
And it's like she said,

1310
00:51:05,092 --> 00:51:08,733
a very small bite of a really complex

1311
00:51:08,833 --> 00:51:09,213
issue.

1312
00:51:09,632 --> 00:51:11,614
There's children going through different

1313
00:51:11,653 --> 00:51:14,675
various abuses or dangers

1314
00:51:15,329 --> 00:51:17,891
or even having like at minimum corporate

1315
00:51:17,911 --> 00:51:19,351
surveillance being normalized in their

1316
00:51:19,411 --> 00:51:19,771
life.

1317
00:51:20,431 --> 00:51:22,072
I feel bad for kids these days.

1318
00:51:22,112 --> 00:51:24,052
They're being told that they can't use

1319
00:51:24,092 --> 00:51:25,652
their phones at school and having phone

1320
00:51:25,672 --> 00:51:26,032
bans,

1321
00:51:26,072 --> 00:51:27,873
but then the school hands them a

1322
00:51:27,952 --> 00:51:30,273
surveillance riddled laptop full of

1323
00:51:30,333 --> 00:51:31,494
spyware essentially.

1324
00:51:32,414 --> 00:51:34,635
And it's an issue.

1325
00:51:34,675 --> 00:51:36,735
There was another teenager recently,

1326
00:51:37,815 --> 00:51:40,036
he spoke at DEFCON last year about how

1327
00:51:40,096 --> 00:51:43,916
he found a vape detection device in his

1328
00:51:43,956 --> 00:51:44,217
school.

1329
00:51:44,815 --> 00:51:46,456
and broke that down with another hacker

1330
00:51:47,217 --> 00:51:48,277
out in the Portland area.

1331
00:51:49,597 --> 00:51:52,300
And the device came with its own issues

1332
00:51:52,340 --> 00:51:54,061
and vulnerabilities and problems.

1333
00:51:55,101 --> 00:51:56,762
And seeing these technologies being

1334
00:51:56,802 --> 00:52:00,585
deployed in school and seeing technologies

1335
00:52:00,626 --> 00:52:02,606
being forced onto kids without much

1336
00:52:02,646 --> 00:52:03,688
conversation with the parents,

1337
00:52:03,708 --> 00:52:05,389
the parents just get a notification.

1338
00:52:05,769 --> 00:52:06,769
It happened to me, hey,

1339
00:52:06,829 --> 00:52:09,152
we're using this app for a daycare.

1340
00:52:09,871 --> 00:52:12,094
And that actually spiraled into me having

1341
00:52:12,134 --> 00:52:13,594
to investigate the privacy

1342
00:52:13,972 --> 00:52:15,393
of daycare applications.

1343
00:52:15,893 --> 00:52:19,155
So it's very much so an issue where

1344
00:52:19,596 --> 00:52:21,617
kids are being told that corporate

1345
00:52:21,637 --> 00:52:22,637
surveillance is okay.

1346
00:52:23,599 --> 00:52:25,340
Violating your privacy is okay,

1347
00:52:25,559 --> 00:52:27,661
but we're keeping you safe by kicking you

1348
00:52:27,760 --> 00:52:31,063
all off these platforms and keeping you

1349
00:52:31,103 --> 00:52:32,824
away from the bits of information that you

1350
00:52:32,844 --> 00:52:33,704
can have online.

1351
00:52:33,744 --> 00:52:35,786
I think also nothing can replace a

1352
00:52:35,826 --> 00:52:37,106
conversation with your children.

1353
00:52:37,934 --> 00:52:39,835
My six-year-old knows why she can't browse

1354
00:52:39,876 --> 00:52:40,956
YouTube by herself.

1355
00:52:41,237 --> 00:52:42,739
And she can articulate that back to me.

1356
00:52:42,778 --> 00:52:44,619
And if a six-year-old can do that and

1357
00:52:44,659 --> 00:52:45,601
understand that with me,

1358
00:52:45,661 --> 00:52:48,802
I think people can go the extra mile

1359
00:52:49,322 --> 00:52:50,483
just a little bit and have that

1360
00:52:50,523 --> 00:52:52,626
conversation with their older children who

1361
00:52:52,666 --> 00:52:54,807
are online and have devices.

1362
00:52:55,688 --> 00:52:58,110
And it has to take a community effect

1363
00:52:58,190 --> 00:53:01,092
here to actually impact the safety of

1364
00:53:01,132 --> 00:53:03,693
children and their everyday life and

1365
00:53:03,813 --> 00:53:04,253
online.

1366
00:53:05,315 --> 00:53:07,077
So we can't forget about in real life

1367
00:53:07,097 --> 00:53:07,556
with children.

1368
00:53:07,981 --> 00:53:09,842
And I think this techno-solutionism aspect

1369
00:53:09,882 --> 00:53:12,422
of age verification takes the route that

1370
00:53:13,603 --> 00:53:16,704
blocking and censorship and excluding them

1371
00:53:16,905 --> 00:53:19,465
offline and treating the internet as if

1372
00:53:19,505 --> 00:53:20,467
it's just TikTok.

1373
00:53:21,086 --> 00:53:23,947
And it takes advantage of parental fears

1374
00:53:23,967 --> 00:53:27,010
around social media and all the things

1375
00:53:27,030 --> 00:53:28,570
that can possibly come with gaming

1376
00:53:28,610 --> 00:53:29,291
platforms.

1377
00:53:29,630 --> 00:53:31,271
And it boils it down to the internet

1378
00:53:31,452 --> 00:53:32,411
is not just TikTok.

1379
00:53:32,431 --> 00:53:33,733
The internet is a great place.

1380
00:53:33,913 --> 00:53:34,452
And it can be.

1381
00:53:34,472 --> 00:53:35,532
It has a lot of information on it

1382
00:53:35,552 --> 00:53:36,114
that's useful.

1383
00:53:37,215 --> 00:53:39,597
there's a lot wrong right now thanks to

1384
00:53:39,737 --> 00:53:40,898
different corporate entities,

1385
00:53:41,519 --> 00:53:43,320
but those are things that need to be

1386
00:53:43,400 --> 00:53:44,481
solved in different ways,

1387
00:53:44,641 --> 00:53:46,443
not through age verification.

1388
00:53:46,884 --> 00:53:48,385
It doesn't do anything about any of those

1389
00:53:48,445 --> 00:53:49,967
problems, right?

1390
00:53:50,047 --> 00:53:50,766
So it,

1391
00:53:51,248 --> 00:53:54,911
it's a very small portion of what is

1392
00:53:54,971 --> 00:53:57,472
wrong and it addresses it in a way

1393
00:53:57,512 --> 00:54:02,137
that burdens us all with having to find

1394
00:54:02,157 --> 00:54:03,418
some way to be able to use the

1395
00:54:03,458 --> 00:54:06,079
internet freely and

1396
00:54:06,579 --> 00:54:09,581
access lawful content freely.

1397
00:54:09,601 --> 00:54:12,043
So I do believe that if parents are

1398
00:54:12,063 --> 00:54:13,684
afraid about their children being online

1399
00:54:14,083 --> 00:54:15,224
and have those concerns,

1400
00:54:15,726 --> 00:54:18,067
there should be some sort of way of

1401
00:54:18,086 --> 00:54:19,447
being able to address that.

1402
00:54:19,527 --> 00:54:20,768
And parental tools exist.

1403
00:54:21,570 --> 00:54:22,791
Parental controls exist.

1404
00:54:23,510 --> 00:54:24,532
And there's plenty of them.

1405
00:54:25,192 --> 00:54:26,532
There was a study out that not a

1406
00:54:26,552 --> 00:54:27,954
lot of parents actually utilize these

1407
00:54:27,974 --> 00:54:30,175
tools due to maybe usability issues and

1408
00:54:30,215 --> 00:54:30,416
such.

1409
00:54:30,916 --> 00:54:32,518
And I do believe that if you take

1410
00:54:32,538 --> 00:54:32,938
the moment

1411
00:54:33,530 --> 00:54:35,650
to go with the revamp tooling that I've

1412
00:54:35,670 --> 00:54:37,731
seen from like Apple or Google for like

1413
00:54:37,771 --> 00:54:39,172
children's accounts and such,

1414
00:54:39,753 --> 00:54:41,574
that you'll be able to see that some

1415
00:54:41,594 --> 00:54:43,155
of the tools that you're asking for,

1416
00:54:43,735 --> 00:54:44,956
such as out of New York,

1417
00:54:44,976 --> 00:54:47,237
they were asking for, what was it?

1418
00:54:47,257 --> 00:54:48,918
No notifications at night or something

1419
00:54:48,938 --> 00:54:50,858
like that as a mandate in the bill.

1420
00:54:51,119 --> 00:54:51,980
That exists already.

1421
00:54:52,000 --> 00:54:53,061
It's called do not disturb.

1422
00:54:53,081 --> 00:54:54,101
It's called bedtime mode.

1423
00:54:54,201 --> 00:54:54,802
There's different,

1424
00:54:55,641 --> 00:54:56,702
you don't have to legislate this.

1425
00:54:56,722 --> 00:54:58,103
You don't have to redo this.

1426
00:54:58,143 --> 00:54:58,864
This exists.

1427
00:54:59,364 --> 00:55:00,445
The technology exists.

1428
00:55:00,664 --> 00:55:02,126
And I think a lot of parents aren't

1429
00:55:02,166 --> 00:55:02,686
aware of that.

1430
00:55:02,706 --> 00:55:02,985
And I think

1431
00:55:03,438 --> 00:55:06,402
Cora Bennett ,

1432
00:55:03,759 --> 00:55:04,860
Education awareness with parents and

1433
00:55:04,900 --> 00:55:05,541
technology,

1434
00:55:05,981 --> 00:55:07,903
rather than just forcing technology on

1435
00:55:07,943 --> 00:55:11,206
people and the framework of how you feel

1436
00:55:11,286 --> 00:55:12,648
technology should be used.

1437
00:55:12,668 --> 00:55:16,510
Cora Bennett ,

1438
00:55:13,989 --> 00:55:16,351
Is the education aspect is way more useful

1439
00:55:16,391 --> 00:55:18,974
than the nurturing aspect is way more

1440
00:55:19,054 --> 00:55:21,237
useful than authoritarianism and.

1441
00:55:21,677 --> 00:55:23,519
Cora Bennett , A verification mandates.

1442
00:55:24,900 --> 00:55:26,581
Yeah, those are great points.

1443
00:55:26,661 --> 00:55:28,282
And we're going to move to audience

1444
00:55:28,342 --> 00:55:29,302
questions now.

1445
00:55:29,342 --> 00:55:31,264
And there was one question that's actually

1446
00:55:32,704 --> 00:55:34,045
relevant to what we're talking about now

1447
00:55:34,106 --> 00:55:36,266
from SF Dad, twenty five one.

1448
00:55:37,146 --> 00:55:37,586
They asked,

1449
00:55:37,666 --> 00:55:38,827
I'd love to hear some tips or

1450
00:55:38,847 --> 00:55:40,588
recommendations for interacting with other

1451
00:55:40,668 --> 00:55:42,650
parents of middle schoolers on this topic.

1452
00:55:43,050 --> 00:55:44,530
I hear a lot of my peers cheering

1453
00:55:44,570 --> 00:55:46,771
at the passage of age gating legislation

1454
00:55:46,811 --> 00:55:48,773
because they want to prevent their own

1455
00:55:48,813 --> 00:55:50,474
kids from accessing social media,

1456
00:55:50,514 --> 00:55:51,134
for example.

1457
00:55:51,603 --> 00:55:52,385
In conversation,

1458
00:55:52,425 --> 00:55:53,746
I've tried pointing out that the current

1459
00:55:53,786 --> 00:55:55,768
implementation of these laws have a lot of

1460
00:55:55,847 --> 00:55:57,309
unintended consequences.

1461
00:55:57,688 --> 00:55:59,471
That is, it won't just affect your kids.

1462
00:55:59,951 --> 00:56:01,152
The goal of changing minds,

1463
00:56:01,251 --> 00:56:02,913
or at least encouraging folks to think

1464
00:56:02,952 --> 00:56:04,173
more deeply about the problem,

1465
00:56:04,494 --> 00:56:07,456
what else can I do in this situation?

1466
00:56:07,516 --> 00:56:08,838
I think, Alexis,

1467
00:56:08,858 --> 00:56:10,320
you just brought up a lot of great

1468
00:56:10,360 --> 00:56:12,380
points on what to say in response about

1469
00:56:12,420 --> 00:56:15,364
how the internet can be a source of

1470
00:56:15,403 --> 00:56:15,623
good,

1471
00:56:15,643 --> 00:56:16,605
and there's a lot of good in

1472
00:56:18,271 --> 00:56:19,793
the information that young people can

1473
00:56:19,873 --> 00:56:20,554
access online.

1474
00:56:20,614 --> 00:56:22,876
Anything else that folks want to add on

1475
00:56:22,916 --> 00:56:27,342
to SF Dad?

1476
00:56:27,362 --> 00:56:28,844
I would add, you know,

1477
00:56:28,885 --> 00:56:30,628
look at the ways that there's

1478
00:56:32,378 --> 00:56:33,119
For all of us,

1479
00:56:33,818 --> 00:56:36,621
there are efforts to push us all onto

1480
00:56:36,661 --> 00:56:37,981
digital identification,

1481
00:56:38,583 --> 00:56:40,364
and age is only one of them.

1482
00:56:41,324 --> 00:56:43,726
There was just an effort defeated in

1483
00:56:43,987 --> 00:56:47,550
Britain this past week where there was a

1484
00:56:47,769 --> 00:56:50,472
government push for workers in order to

1485
00:56:50,711 --> 00:56:52,114
work to have digital ID.

1486
00:56:52,713 --> 00:56:54,715
that affirms their immigration status.

1487
00:56:55,096 --> 00:56:57,697
So we can see the creep to go

1488
00:56:57,737 --> 00:56:59,619
back to the word that seems to be

1489
00:56:59,659 --> 00:57:02,021
the word cloud theme of this conversation.

1490
00:57:02,201 --> 00:57:05,284
The expansion of the logic from age gating

1491
00:57:05,744 --> 00:57:08,766
to immigration status gaging is

1492
00:57:08,846 --> 00:57:10,688
potentially expansive.

1493
00:57:10,927 --> 00:57:12,849
And when we're living in a country where

1494
00:57:13,570 --> 00:57:16,010
our vice president is openly socializing

1495
00:57:16,130 --> 00:57:17,911
and citing to people who believe that

1496
00:57:17,951 --> 00:57:19,690
women have the intellectual capacity as

1497
00:57:19,771 --> 00:57:20,211
children,

1498
00:57:20,811 --> 00:57:23,152
we can imagine that it is only a

1499
00:57:23,192 --> 00:57:25,172
matter of time before gender gating is

1500
00:57:25,353 --> 00:57:27,452
also something that is imagined,

1501
00:57:27,632 --> 00:57:32,074
if not also pushed for the purpose of

1502
00:57:32,134 --> 00:57:33,894
legislating other people's morality.

1503
00:57:34,275 --> 00:57:36,835
So I would add to everything Alexis said,

1504
00:57:36,856 --> 00:57:38,576
which I think are all really grounded and

1505
00:57:38,715 --> 00:57:40,556
excellent points to bring up with parents,

1506
00:57:40,956 --> 00:57:42,536
that this is not just about

1507
00:57:43,496 --> 00:57:45,237
um protecting young people it's about

1508
00:57:45,277 --> 00:57:47,739
protecting us all and really thinking

1509
00:57:47,780 --> 00:57:50,541
about young people as people invested in

1510
00:57:50,621 --> 00:57:53,945
learning from the internet and and having

1511
00:57:53,985 --> 00:57:57,007
parents be um sort of co-learners as we're

1512
00:57:57,067 --> 00:57:59,467
all trying to navigate an environment with

1513
00:57:59,568 --> 00:58:01,010
news that we have to think more

1514
00:58:01,769 --> 00:58:04,471
deeply about its sources from as we all

1515
00:58:04,771 --> 00:58:06,391
have to think a little bit more about

1516
00:58:06,452 --> 00:58:08,713
why we're being shown something giving

1517
00:58:08,753 --> 00:58:11,313
kids the tools to um sort of add

1518
00:58:11,333 --> 00:58:14,175
that critical thinking to their um to

1519
00:58:14,215 --> 00:58:16,695
their daily life and to our daily lives

1520
00:58:16,815 --> 00:58:18,275
is i think what will help us all

1521
00:58:18,295 --> 00:58:24,197
yeah those are great points um hannah

1522
00:58:24,298 --> 00:58:26,920
anything now i know you're not a parent

1523
00:58:26,960 --> 00:58:27,079
but

1524
00:58:30,309 --> 00:58:31,369
I mean, I can add one,

1525
00:58:31,730 --> 00:58:34,090
I'll add a line of like, to,

1526
00:58:34,110 --> 00:58:34,849
you know,

1527
00:58:34,969 --> 00:58:37,050
reaffirm what Cynthia and Alexis have said

1528
00:58:37,090 --> 00:58:38,331
that, yeah, it can, it's gonna,

1529
00:58:39,490 --> 00:58:41,972
it's gonna expand way faster than we think

1530
00:58:42,152 --> 00:58:42,711
once, you know,

1531
00:58:42,831 --> 00:58:45,733
some of these policies take a shape that

1532
00:58:45,773 --> 00:58:47,293
maybe parents may initially like,

1533
00:58:47,813 --> 00:58:48,972
and then, you know,

1534
00:58:48,992 --> 00:58:51,193
the rest will snowball into something

1535
00:58:51,233 --> 00:58:51,653
that, you know,

1536
00:58:51,673 --> 00:58:53,114
we've seen time and time again with other

1537
00:58:53,173 --> 00:58:56,755
sort of, you know, norms and policies.

1538
00:58:56,954 --> 00:58:57,135
So,

1539
00:58:57,934 --> 00:59:00,940
Yeah, I think part of me is like,

1540
00:59:01,061 --> 00:59:01,141
oh,

1541
00:59:01,181 --> 00:59:03,063
do we need to like reteach parents about

1542
00:59:03,103 --> 00:59:03,945
the surveillance state?

1543
00:59:03,965 --> 00:59:05,228
And the answer might be yes,

1544
00:59:06,128 --> 00:59:07,331
but not sure we all have time for

1545
00:59:07,371 --> 00:59:08,512
that completely.

1546
00:59:09,588 --> 00:59:11,268
Yeah.

1547
00:59:11,289 --> 00:59:13,190
Frisky Goat asks,

1548
00:59:13,289 --> 00:59:15,472
if I run a personal non-commercial blog

1549
00:59:15,512 --> 00:59:17,152
website with some adult content,

1550
00:59:17,713 --> 00:59:19,494
but the website is not focused around it,

1551
00:59:19,574 --> 00:59:21,876
how would I comply with such age check

1552
00:59:21,896 --> 00:59:22,576
regulation?

1553
00:59:22,996 --> 00:59:24,637
I do not have money for proprietary

1554
00:59:24,677 --> 00:59:25,117
checkers,

1555
00:59:26,358 --> 00:59:28,599
nor I want to violate visitors' privacy.

1556
00:59:28,639 --> 00:59:30,181
Feels like bigger platforms have a

1557
00:59:30,201 --> 00:59:32,682
monopoly and indie websites have to censor

1558
00:59:32,742 --> 00:59:33,583
slash close.

1559
00:59:35,804 --> 00:59:37,445
I think you're correct, Ferskiko.

1560
00:59:38,846 --> 00:59:39,465
We actually,

1561
00:59:39,507 --> 00:59:41,507
our colleague Molly Buckley wrote a great

1562
00:59:41,568 --> 00:59:43,670
piece on this that we'll drop in the

1563
00:59:43,710 --> 00:59:44,550
chat titled,

1564
00:59:44,911 --> 00:59:49,574
Why Age Verification is a Windfall for Big

1565
00:59:49,614 --> 00:59:51,295
Tech and a Death Sentence for Smaller

1566
00:59:51,335 --> 00:59:52,016
Platforms.

1567
00:59:52,376 --> 00:59:54,038
Smaller platforms that won't be able to

1568
00:59:54,057 --> 00:59:56,500
afford these checkers are going to be

1569
00:59:56,539 --> 00:59:58,661
forced to shut down and create even bigger

1570
00:59:59,001 --> 01:00:01,083
monopolies around social media platforms.

1571
01:00:02,150 --> 01:00:02,809
you're spot on,

1572
01:00:03,190 --> 01:00:06,871
but does everyone else have responses to

1573
01:00:06,891 --> 01:00:12,733
brisket goat?

1574
01:00:12,753 --> 01:00:12,992
Well,

1575
01:00:13,052 --> 01:00:15,034
last question I think we have time for

1576
01:00:15,634 --> 01:00:20,054
is from Iromia and their question is,

1577
01:00:20,114 --> 01:00:22,996
how can we push back and how can

1578
01:00:23,016 --> 01:00:25,016
we keep age verification data from being

1579
01:00:25,076 --> 01:00:27,217
leaked and stolen?

1580
01:00:27,257 --> 01:00:29,898
The second one I fear is out of

1581
01:00:29,958 --> 01:00:30,717
all of our control.

1582
01:00:31,704 --> 01:00:33,146
But if anyone has thoughts on that,

1583
01:00:33,186 --> 01:00:34,106
feel free to opine.

1584
01:00:34,146 --> 01:00:35,907
But the bigger question of how can we

1585
01:00:35,967 --> 01:00:36,407
push back,

1586
01:00:36,447 --> 01:00:38,168
I'd love to hear from everyone as a

1587
01:00:38,489 --> 01:00:39,050
parting note.

1588
01:00:39,070 --> 01:00:41,911
We can start with you, Cynthia.

1589
01:00:43,637 --> 01:00:44,018
Sure.

1590
01:00:44,177 --> 01:00:44,579
I mean,

1591
01:00:44,659 --> 01:00:46,619
as many ways as we all can,

1592
01:00:46,840 --> 01:00:49,681
I think, use our physical IDs,

1593
01:00:51,181 --> 01:00:53,822
choose the checkout line that has a person

1594
01:00:54,184 --> 01:00:55,403
you can interact with.

1595
01:00:55,925 --> 01:00:57,425
In as many ways as you can,

1596
01:00:57,465 --> 01:01:00,226
when you're given the options to use cash,

1597
01:01:00,246 --> 01:01:01,568
to use your physical card,

1598
01:01:01,608 --> 01:01:02,887
to use a

1599
01:01:04,268 --> 01:01:06,289
checkout line that has a clerk that i

1600
01:01:06,309 --> 01:01:07,630
don't know you might have a cute moment

1601
01:01:07,670 --> 01:01:10,951
with who knows it's not you know the

1602
01:01:10,971 --> 01:01:13,751
the um idea that interacting with each

1603
01:01:13,811 --> 01:01:16,672
other or or you know showing your id

1604
01:01:16,693 --> 01:01:19,693
to someone um at the pharmacy perhaps for

1605
01:01:19,733 --> 01:01:21,355
the first time but not having to do

1606
01:01:21,394 --> 01:01:22,954
it again for the second or third time

1607
01:01:22,974 --> 01:01:26,396
because you are known um sort of thinking

1608
01:01:26,436 --> 01:01:29,077
about the ways that that community

1609
01:01:29,838 --> 01:01:31,818
interaction and the community fluidity

1610
01:01:31,858 --> 01:01:33,059
that we have with each other

1611
01:01:33,599 --> 01:01:36,242
is itself a protection that we can lean

1612
01:01:36,362 --> 01:01:39,527
on and hold each other more accountable,

1613
01:01:39,668 --> 01:01:41,670
then we can hold a big tech company

1614
01:01:41,791 --> 01:01:42,311
accountable.

1615
01:01:42,391 --> 01:01:45,175
So part of what our calls in our,

1616
01:01:45,215 --> 01:01:46,356
if you look at our link that I

1617
01:01:46,376 --> 01:01:47,998
shared or that was shared earlier,

1618
01:01:48,119 --> 01:01:48,519
thank you.

1619
01:01:50,277 --> 01:01:52,418
Part of our demands are just using

1620
01:01:52,498 --> 01:01:53,360
physical cards more,

1621
01:01:53,400 --> 01:01:58,063
resisting the push to download that mobile

1622
01:01:58,103 --> 01:01:58,983
driver's license.

1623
01:01:59,384 --> 01:02:01,585
And then also when it comes to policy,

1624
01:02:01,644 --> 01:02:02,485
being engaged,

1625
01:02:02,626 --> 01:02:04,827
understanding why it's important that

1626
01:02:05,447 --> 01:02:08,510
local businesses allow you to pay and

1627
01:02:08,570 --> 01:02:09,630
accept cash,

1628
01:02:10,150 --> 01:02:12,172
understanding how having the physical

1629
01:02:12,211 --> 01:02:13,112
versions of everything,

1630
01:02:13,193 --> 01:02:15,795
of having the ability to call an agency

1631
01:02:15,934 --> 01:02:17,396
and find a person on the phone,

1632
01:02:17,856 --> 01:02:19,277
of being able to go down to an

1633
01:02:19,376 --> 01:02:21,557
agency and find someone that you can speak

1634
01:02:21,597 --> 01:02:22,277
to one-on-one,

1635
01:02:22,697 --> 01:02:25,300
of really insisting that while we have a

1636
01:02:25,340 --> 01:02:26,679
lot of digital conveniences,

1637
01:02:26,719 --> 01:02:29,181
that every single opportunity we have as

1638
01:02:29,221 --> 01:02:31,141
the public to directly interact with our

1639
01:02:31,181 --> 01:02:33,402
government and to participate in the

1640
01:02:33,742 --> 01:02:35,503
development of policy we have to take

1641
01:02:35,983 --> 01:02:36,965
before it's taken away.

1642
01:02:39,110 --> 01:02:41,132
I'd love to add on to that.

1643
01:02:41,211 --> 01:02:43,092
I noticed in the chat we got a

1644
01:02:43,153 --> 01:02:45,235
message from an Iowa senator saying,

1645
01:02:46,175 --> 01:02:48,577
contact and educate their legislator on

1646
01:02:48,617 --> 01:02:49,239
the issue.

1647
01:02:49,298 --> 01:02:51,800
Legislators are scared to vote against it

1648
01:02:51,840 --> 01:02:53,682
because they'll be accused of showing

1649
01:02:53,742 --> 01:02:55,003
adult content to kids.

1650
01:02:55,784 --> 01:02:59,005
And so I always am urging young people

1651
01:02:59,286 --> 01:03:01,547
to get involved in the legislative and

1652
01:03:01,606 --> 01:03:03,786
advocacy process as early as possible,

1653
01:03:04,188 --> 01:03:07,548
but also holding these big tech or

1654
01:03:07,628 --> 01:03:10,889
companies accountable for your experience

1655
01:03:10,969 --> 01:03:11,471
online.

1656
01:03:11,911 --> 01:03:14,552
And I agree with Cynthia that the more

1657
01:03:15,132 --> 01:03:17,552
sort of using cash and your card in

1658
01:03:17,592 --> 01:03:21,135
person over tap and pay or anything

1659
01:03:21,235 --> 01:03:22,155
similar to that,

1660
01:03:23,244 --> 01:03:24,666
you know, is always the move.

1661
01:03:25,706 --> 01:03:27,367
You know, if you're in a big city,

1662
01:03:27,467 --> 01:03:29,489
I'm also in just a general surveillance

1663
01:03:29,650 --> 01:03:31,911
kind of practice of wearing your mask on

1664
01:03:31,951 --> 01:03:33,871
public transit or just generally not just

1665
01:03:33,891 --> 01:03:35,652
to keep yourself safe, you know,

1666
01:03:36,094 --> 01:03:36,753
health wise.

1667
01:03:36,793 --> 01:03:37,815
There's so many, I guess,

1668
01:03:37,835 --> 01:03:40,175
like benefits to, you know,

1669
01:03:40,195 --> 01:03:42,338
when you're kind of working to protect

1670
01:03:42,378 --> 01:03:44,099
yourself, you know,

1671
01:03:44,119 --> 01:03:45,400
there's so many additional benefits that

1672
01:03:45,420 --> 01:03:45,760
come with that.

1673
01:03:45,780 --> 01:03:45,960
Yeah.

1674
01:03:46,340 --> 01:03:46,420
Yeah.

1675
01:03:46,440 --> 01:03:46,559
Yeah.

1676
01:03:52,954 --> 01:03:54,735
So my answer probably is a little bit

1677
01:03:54,755 --> 01:03:56,518
more nebulous and esoteric,

1678
01:03:56,597 --> 01:03:59,860
but I do try to at least talk

1679
01:03:59,880 --> 01:04:01,382
about pushing back against some of these

1680
01:04:01,402 --> 01:04:03,282
core narratives that are inciting public

1681
01:04:03,302 --> 01:04:04,724
fear about children online.

1682
01:04:05,304 --> 01:04:08,387
There are actual valid studies about what

1683
01:04:08,447 --> 01:04:10,369
harms actually come to children when they

1684
01:04:10,449 --> 01:04:12,710
are online and how you can address them.

1685
01:04:12,769 --> 01:04:15,932
And I think approaching and pushing these

1686
01:04:16,532 --> 01:04:19,795
more well-founded studies and aspects of

1687
01:04:20,036 --> 01:04:21,317
what can be considered harms

1688
01:04:21,885 --> 01:04:24,407
is something that can be promoted,

1689
01:04:24,547 --> 01:04:26,447
something that can be done in

1690
01:04:26,487 --> 01:04:27,168
conversation.

1691
01:04:27,788 --> 01:04:29,349
One of the biggest examples that I've seen

1692
01:04:29,389 --> 01:04:31,550
with age verification and sensationalism

1693
01:04:31,610 --> 01:04:33,610
around children and harm online is a

1694
01:04:34,150 --> 01:04:35,791
Brazilian law that just went into effect

1695
01:04:36,251 --> 01:04:37,251
for age verification.

1696
01:04:37,731 --> 01:04:39,333
And I had to find a great irony

1697
01:04:39,512 --> 01:04:41,074
in that they were talking about how

1698
01:04:41,153 --> 01:04:43,195
children are being exploited online for

1699
01:04:43,235 --> 01:04:45,675
various reasons, engaging in adult acts,

1700
01:04:46,215 --> 01:04:48,336
and the entire public

1701
01:04:50,048 --> 01:04:52,349
The public catalyst was a YouTube video by

1702
01:04:52,369 --> 01:04:54,771
an influencer who is not a child care

1703
01:04:54,871 --> 01:04:55,251
expert,

1704
01:04:55,431 --> 01:04:57,452
who is not a child endangerment expert,

1705
01:04:57,831 --> 01:04:59,693
who is not a child exploitation expert,

1706
01:04:59,952 --> 01:05:01,893
but just an influencer online that made I

1707
01:05:01,952 --> 01:05:03,813
think about a forty minute video and

1708
01:05:03,873 --> 01:05:05,675
incited the public to do something about

1709
01:05:05,715 --> 01:05:07,934
it with age verification.

1710
01:05:08,056 --> 01:05:10,076
I had to take a moment of the

1711
01:05:10,155 --> 01:05:11,817
irony of adults being manipulated by

1712
01:05:11,956 --> 01:05:14,998
online content while saying that children

1713
01:05:15,038 --> 01:05:16,938
are being manipulated by online

1714
01:05:16,958 --> 01:05:17,478
interaction.

1715
01:05:19,224 --> 01:05:21,085
And I have to take a pause and

1716
01:05:21,105 --> 01:05:22,405
say like you as an adult,

1717
01:05:23,567 --> 01:05:26,608
what are you doing and reacting to when

1718
01:05:26,648 --> 01:05:28,929
it comes to keeping children safe online

1719
01:05:29,550 --> 01:05:31,751
and challenging that narrative overall is

1720
01:05:31,791 --> 01:05:33,213
something that I think that we can

1721
01:05:33,612 --> 01:05:35,554
definitely do with all of ourselves,

1722
01:05:35,594 --> 01:05:38,255
have some sort of introspection and being

1723
01:05:38,295 --> 01:05:39,396
able to have those conversations.

1724
01:05:39,476 --> 01:05:41,177
A lot of people are scared because of

1725
01:05:41,197 --> 01:05:43,820
a lot of different types of content that

1726
01:05:43,860 --> 01:05:46,342
are happening and promoting that children

1727
01:05:46,422 --> 01:05:46,922
online

1728
01:05:47,597 --> 01:05:49,139
are coming with these like exploitative

1729
01:05:49,179 --> 01:05:49,719
dangers.

1730
01:05:50,219 --> 01:05:51,340
And then these,

1731
01:05:51,380 --> 01:05:54,103
some of these dangers are not in grounded

1732
01:05:54,163 --> 01:05:56,503
theory and they're not in grounded actions

1733
01:05:56,664 --> 01:05:57,905
or evidence.

1734
01:05:58,405 --> 01:06:01,307
And so if you're reacting to a influencers

1735
01:06:01,347 --> 01:06:03,548
video about children online, I have to,

1736
01:06:03,588 --> 01:06:06,630
I have to question whether or not that

1737
01:06:06,670 --> 01:06:07,652
this is the best approach.

1738
01:06:07,692 --> 01:06:08,612
So now we have a deal with the

1739
01:06:08,632 --> 01:06:09,913
law and now we have to deal with

1740
01:06:09,932 --> 01:06:12,135
like these implementations and you can do

1741
01:06:12,155 --> 01:06:13,655
things like look at these implementations,

1742
01:06:13,675 --> 01:06:14,976
like what implementations happening in

1743
01:06:15,036 --> 01:06:16,597
your area of the world.

1744
01:06:17,262 --> 01:06:18,963
and what vendors are being involved,

1745
01:06:19,103 --> 01:06:20,264
challenging those vendors,

1746
01:06:20,324 --> 01:06:22,065
challenging that aspect of,

1747
01:06:22,166 --> 01:06:24,907
there was something that one of our

1748
01:06:24,947 --> 01:06:26,949
colleagues said recently at EFF that I

1749
01:06:26,989 --> 01:06:27,871
thought was very,

1750
01:06:27,951 --> 01:06:31,132
very poignant was she said that there's

1751
01:06:31,273 --> 01:06:32,715
politics of procurement,

1752
01:06:34,797 --> 01:06:36,498
and Cynthia had spoke to that earlier,

1753
01:06:37,117 --> 01:06:39,539
and getting involved in those politics

1754
01:06:39,800 --> 01:06:43,083
actually is very impactful when you look

1755
01:06:43,123 --> 01:06:45,085
at how governments are procuring

1756
01:06:45,693 --> 01:06:47,534
these vendors for age verification.

1757
01:06:47,876 --> 01:06:49,336
A lot of the age verification methods like

1758
01:06:49,436 --> 01:06:50,157
age estimation,

1759
01:06:50,317 --> 01:06:52,338
age inference have a lot of databases

1760
01:06:52,378 --> 01:06:54,239
involved that actually reward a lot of

1761
01:06:54,280 --> 01:06:56,001
data brokers for the years and years and

1762
01:06:56,041 --> 01:06:58,282
years of privacy violating practices that

1763
01:06:58,302 --> 01:06:59,103
they have done for us.

1764
01:06:59,423 --> 01:07:01,246
And now they are contracting them to do

1765
01:07:01,646 --> 01:07:03,626
age estimation and age inference on

1766
01:07:04,007 --> 01:07:05,228
various people's accounts.

1767
01:07:05,929 --> 01:07:07,150
We need to track these things.

1768
01:07:07,449 --> 01:07:08,771
And the more that you do that and

1769
01:07:08,811 --> 01:07:10,853
bring attention to the actual harms being

1770
01:07:10,893 --> 01:07:14,034
done and the actual practices that are in

1771
01:07:14,094 --> 01:07:14,474
play,

1772
01:07:14,715 --> 01:07:15,295
I do believe that

1773
01:07:15,748 --> 01:07:16,869
pushing back against some of this

1774
01:07:16,929 --> 01:07:19,452
narrative that we're seeing also helps.

1775
01:07:20,253 --> 01:07:22,215
It's not as concrete of an action,

1776
01:07:22,295 --> 01:07:24,699
but I do think it's something to poke

1777
01:07:24,719 --> 01:07:26,641
at the public zeitgeist a little bit when

1778
01:07:26,661 --> 01:07:28,443
it comes to age verification.

1779
01:07:28,503 --> 01:07:29,925
Yeah, no, all great points.

1780
01:07:30,005 --> 01:07:30,125
And

1781
01:07:30,806 --> 01:07:31,786
I'll just add, you know,

1782
01:07:31,947 --> 01:07:33,289
I work on state legislation,

1783
01:07:33,369 --> 01:07:35,431
so I wouldn't be me if I didn't

1784
01:07:35,471 --> 01:07:37,713
co-sign Hannah's point about reaching out

1785
01:07:37,753 --> 01:07:38,673
to your legislators.

1786
01:07:38,733 --> 01:07:41,195
A lot of these bills are being considered

1787
01:07:41,315 --> 01:07:44,559
actively in state houses and in Congress.

1788
01:07:45,320 --> 01:07:47,121
So, you know, as I mentioned,

1789
01:07:47,141 --> 01:07:48,822
there was nineteen bills being taken up

1790
01:07:49,543 --> 01:07:50,925
about, you know,

1791
01:07:50,965 --> 01:07:52,326
so-called kids safety online.

1792
01:07:52,385 --> 01:07:54,047
And everyone has, you know,

1793
01:07:54,088 --> 01:07:54,748
if you're in the U.S.,

1794
01:07:54,768 --> 01:07:56,090
you have a congressperson you can reach

1795
01:07:56,130 --> 01:07:56,429
out to.

1796
01:07:57,860 --> 01:07:59,784
And if you haven't checked out our age

1797
01:07:59,804 --> 01:08:01,748
verification hub either, unfortunately,

1798
01:08:01,768 --> 01:08:04,255
this is the only,

1799
01:08:04,295 --> 01:08:05,739
these will be the only questions we have

1800
01:08:05,778 --> 01:08:06,199
time for.

1801
01:08:07,331 --> 01:08:09,192
our age verification hub might have

1802
01:08:09,331 --> 01:08:11,733
answers to most of your questions.

1803
01:08:12,054 --> 01:08:13,155
So please do check it out.

1804
01:08:13,454 --> 01:08:15,956
We also have a page on how you

1805
01:08:15,976 --> 01:08:18,497
can help us fight back with, you know,

1806
01:08:18,518 --> 01:08:21,460
certain links for actions and whatnot.

1807
01:08:22,640 --> 01:08:24,141
But thank you.

1808
01:08:24,162 --> 01:08:26,283
I want to first thank Alexis, Cynthia,

1809
01:08:26,323 --> 01:08:27,644
and Hannah for joining us today.

1810
01:08:28,003 --> 01:08:29,886
Thank you to everyone who contributed to

1811
01:08:29,907 --> 01:08:31,609
the discussion in the chat for the great

1812
01:08:31,649 --> 01:08:33,730
questions and everyone for watching around

1813
01:08:33,770 --> 01:08:34,271
the world.

1814
01:08:34,712 --> 01:08:36,354
Digital rights begin with you.

1815
01:08:36,835 --> 01:08:38,516
EFF has been a leader in privacy,

1816
01:08:38,577 --> 01:08:40,439
freedom of expression and innovation for

1817
01:08:40,479 --> 01:08:41,400
thirty five years,

1818
01:08:41,701 --> 01:08:42,903
and we need your help to keep the

1819
01:08:42,943 --> 01:08:43,143
fight.

1820
01:08:43,564 --> 01:08:46,225
Become a member today at EFF.org slash

1821
01:08:46,265 --> 01:08:47,086
support change.

1822
01:08:47,445 --> 01:08:48,907
And we hope you will continue these

1823
01:08:48,947 --> 01:08:50,806
conversations about your civil liberties

1824
01:08:50,846 --> 01:08:52,347
with your colleagues and your friends and

1825
01:08:52,368 --> 01:08:52,927
your family.

1826
01:08:53,429 --> 01:08:55,250
Please be sure to mark your calendars for

1827
01:08:55,270 --> 01:08:57,390
the next segment of Effecting Change on

1828
01:08:57,451 --> 01:08:58,490
Thursday, February, February, February,

1829
01:08:58,511 --> 01:08:59,412
February, February, February, February,

1830
01:08:59,431 --> 01:09:00,231
February, February, February, February,

1831
01:09:00,252 --> 01:09:00,431
February,

1832
01:09:00,471 --> 01:09:01,972
where we will be talking about license

1833
01:09:02,012 --> 01:09:03,713
plate readers and their impact on local

1834
01:09:03,734 --> 01:09:04,354
communities.

1835
01:09:04,814 --> 01:09:06,175
Thanks for joining us and we'll see you

1836
01:09:06,194 --> 01:09:06,494
next time.